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Abstract 
Abstract 
 
Aim of the present doctoral thesis was to investigate how the human brain builds a 
positively biased picture one’s own health state. The first part of the section “own 
contributions” is dedicated to the study of positive illusions in the process of self-
evaluation. The second part introduces two experiments on lateralized emotional 
processing, with a special focus on the influence of emotion on spatial attention.  
Anosognosia designates the inability to recognize one’s own illness. Representing one 
of the most striking and enigmatic forms of agnosia, no model is currently able to 
account fully and comprehensively for the phenomenon in its scope and complexity. 
Unlike previous investigations focusing on dysfunction, the present thesis 
emphasizes the study of the normal function impaired in anosognosia, a function 
reasonably labeled nosognosia. Nosognosia is the function that continuously monitors 
our own well-being, against the background of interoceptive and external changes. It 
comprises not only the detection of signs of illness, but also the ability to realistically 
estimate one's future health state. Many studies showed that the latter is generally 
biased towards optimism and that healthy people display a strong tendency to view 
themselves as less likely than others to turn ill. This positive illusion is called 
unrealistic optimism. 
We argue that there is a qualitative similarity between clinical confabulatory 
behavior and unrealistic optimism. Conceptualizing the optimistic attitude inherent 
to nosognosia as a form of “prospective anosognosia”, study 1 supports this view. In 
the same way it abolishes anosognosic denial, left-ear cold water irrigation reduced 
unrealistic optimism for one’s own future health state in healthy subjects. This 
finding indicates the right parieto-insular cortex – activated by this procedure - as a 
key structure for the appraisal of one’s own vulnerability to illness.   
Study 2 and 3 investigate brain lateralization of emotions, exploring the interaction 
between emotional processing and spatial attention. We found a modulation of 
spatial attention by emotional states and traits with a strong association between 
negative affect and leftward hemispatial attention. Our results validate the 
predominant role of the right hemisphere in negative emotions and indicate the 
importance of the parietal lobes in the processing of non-spatial contents. 
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Together, the findings of the experiments with healthy volunteers are consistent with 
clinical observations from patients with unilateral brain lesions as well as with 
previous findings collected in healthy populations. They corroborate the existence of 
functional hemispheric asymmetries in both self-awareness and emotional 
processing and support the view of a right hemisphere specialization for both the 
ability to recognize one’s own illness and to process negative emotions. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Zusammenfassung  
 
Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation war zu untersuchen, wie das menschliche Gehirn 
ein Bild des eigenen Gesundheitszustandes aufbaut, das systematisch zur emotional 
positiven Seite hin verzerrt ist. 
Der erste Teil betrifft das Studium der positiven Illusionen, welche die 
Selbsteinschätzung begleiten. Der zweite Teil konzentriert sich auf die 
hemisphärische Lateralisierung der emotionalen Verarbeitung, mit speziellem Fokus 
auf den Einfluss der Emotionsvalenz auf die räumliche Aufmerksamkeit.  
Anosognosie bezeichnet die Unfähigkeit, die eigene Krankheit zu erkennen. Sie stellt 
eine der eindrucksvollsten und rätselhaftesten Formen von Agnosie dar. Keines der 
existierenden Modelle kann den vollen Umfang der klinischen Manifestationen 
dieses Phänomens erklären.  Im Gegensatz zu bisherigen Untersuchungen, die den 
Schwerpunkt auf die Dysfunktion legen, betont die gegenwärtige Dissertation das 
Studium der normalen Funktion, die in der Anosognosie beeinträchtigt ist; eine 
Funktion, die hier naheliegenderweise als Nosognosie bezeichnet wird. 
Nosognosie ist die Funktion, die vor dem Hintergrund von interozeptiven und 
externen Veränderungen das eigene Wohlbefinden überprüft. Sie erfasst nicht nur 
die Wahrnehmung allfälliger Krankheitszeichen, sondern auch die Fähigkeit, das  
eigene Krankheitsrisiko realistisch einzuschätzen. Eine Fülle von Studien zeigen, 
dass diese Einschätzung systematisch verzerrt ist und zwar zur positiven Seite hin. 
Insbesondere weisen Gesunde eine starke Tendenz auf, das eigene Risiko für 
zukünftige Erkrankung als deutlich geringer zu erachten im Vergleich zum Risiko 
der Mitmenschen. Die Unterschätzung der eigenen Vulnerabilität für Krankheit  
wird als unrealistischer Optimismus bezeichnet.  
Wir denken, dass es eine konzeptuelle Ähnlichkeit zwischen dem klinischen 
konfabulativen Verhalten und dem unrealistischen Optimismus gibt. Wir haben 
deshalb die optimistische Fehleinschätzung als „prospektive Anosognosie“ 
aufgefasst. Die Studie 1 bestätigt unsere Hypothese, dass ähnliche 
neuropsychologische Prozesse der Anosognosie und dem gesunden unrealistischen 
Optimismus zu Grunde liegen. So wie sie die Anosognosie bei Patienten aufhebt, 
führte die kalorische Stimulation des linken Ohrs mit kaltem Wasser zu einer 
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Reduktion des unrealistischen Optimismus in gesunden Probanden. Dieser Befund 
deutet darauf hin, dass der rechte parieto-insuläre Kortex – aktiviert bei dieser 
Methode - eine für die Einschätzung der eigenen Vulnerabilität für Krankheit 
wichtige Struktur ist. Die Studien 2 und 3 untersuchten die Hirnlateralisierung der 
Emotionen und die Interaktion zwischen emotionaler Verarbeitung und räumlicher 
Aufmerksamkeit. Wir beobachteten eine Assoziation zwischen 
persönlichkeitseigener Tendenz zur Bevorzugung der linken Raumhälfte 
(„Pseudoneglekt“) und dem Verarbeiten spezifisch negativer Emotionen (Studie 2) 
und eine Modulation der räumlichen Aufmerksamkeit durch die momentane 
Befindlichkeit (Studie 3). In ihrer Gesamtheit stützen die Resultate vorliegender 
Dissertation die dominierende Rolle der rechten Hemisphäre in der Verarbeitung 
negativer Emotionen und heben die Bedeutung der Parietallappen und ihrer 
Verbindungen für die Verarbeitung nicht-räumlicher Inhalte hervor.  
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 “Even if all our senses are intact and our brain functioning normally, we do not have 
direct access to the physical world. It may feel as if we have direct access, but this is 
an illusion created by our brain” 
 
Chris Frith 
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             General Overview 
1.1 Anosognosia: the denial of illness 
1.1.1 Overview 
The term anosognosia originates from Greek a = without; nosos = disease and gnosis = 
knowledge. It refers to a neurological condition (first described in 1885 by Von 
Monakov) belonging to the disorders of “loss of knowledge”, grouped under the 
term of agnosias. The term anosognosia was introduced in the early 20th century by 
Joseph Babinski (1857-1932), a French neurologist, student of Charcot and 
contemporary of Freud, to describe the impressive condition in which patients 
paralyzed on one side of their body claim that they are in fact perfectly able to move 
(Babinski, 1914). Originally intended to designate unawareness of hemiplegia, the 
term anosognosia has recently reached a broader meaning. Nowadays, most writers 
would agree that “anosognosia” quite generally designates the inability to recognize 
one’s own illness or disability. Nevertheless, it is recognized as a heterogeneous 
neurological disorder, which may selectively impair awareness of any sensory, 
perceptual, motor or cognitive deficits.   
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Many forms of anosognosia have been described (They are summarized in Table 1). 
Some examples of altered self-awareness comprise cortically blind patients, who 
claim that they can see (so-called “Anton syndrome”; Anton, 1896; Goldenberg et al., 
1995), aphasic patients who are unaware of their language deficits (Shuren et al., 
1995), Alzheimer’s patients who fail to acknowledge their memory impairment 
(Kristin & Robin, 2007; Starkstein et al., 2006), as well as patients suffering from 
hemispatial neglect (i.e. failure to explore the side of space contralateral to the lesion) 
being convinced to equally explore both sides of space (Buxbaum et al., 2004). In all 
forms of anosognosia, unawareness can vary in severity, reaching from a simple 
indifference toward one’s own illness or deficit – a condition designated with the 
term of anosodiaphoria (Babinski, 1914) - an active and vehement denial of one’s own 
disability accompanied by confabulations (Marcel et al., 2004). Anosognosic 
symptoms may fluctuate and in case of anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) they 
usually become less intense over time. They occur more frequently and are more 
severe after right hemisphere (RH) lesions, and their incidence is higher after large 
lesions, comprising cortical and subcortical brain areas (Pia et al., 2004). In the last 
two decades, many authors investigated the anatomical correlate of denial (especially 
related to hemiplegia), trying to identify which regions are specifically damaged 
when anosognosia is observed. While most studies agree that lesions usually involve 
the RH, the intra-hemispheric localization of the damage leading to anosognosia 
appears more controversial. In fact, it seems that a unique and circumscribed 
“awareness area” causing, when damaged, denial, does not exist. Awareness 
probably relies on the integrity of a network that involves different cortical and 
subcortical brain regions (recent anatomical findings concerning specifically AHP 
will be considered in the next chapter).  Since a failure in illness recognition has 
serious consequences for recovery and may impair the efficacy of rehabilitative 
measures, the study of anosognosia is not only of theoretical interest but also of great 
clinical relevance. That is why anosognosia has aroused broad interest among 
scientists and clinicians alike.  
The majority of neuroscientists focused on AHP trying to clarify the neural basis of 
motor awareness (Marcel et al., 2004). The large interest for AHP should not surprise 
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if one considers the impressive character of this particular type of denial and the 
ways it affects recovery of motor functionality and interferes with motor 
rehabilitation. In the next chapter, anatomical correlates, diagnostic tools and major 
pathogenetic models for AHP will be reviewed in detail.  
Anosognosia is commonly diagnosed with the help of questionnaires (Bisiach et al., 
1986), which allow to characterize the disorder and to assess the severity of 
unawareness, by asking the patient a series of targeted questions. When approaching 
anosognosic symptoms, three main aspects need to be considered in order to 
characterize the lack of awareness. These aspects are extension, specificity and partiality 
(Marcel et al., 2004). Extension refers to what kind of awareness is compromised. 
Awareness of deficit is not a unitary phenomenon and includes different levels, 
which may be independently compromised. For example, a patient may be aware of 
his deficit but fail to recognize the functional consequences linked to the deficit. The 
ability to realistically predict the outcome of own performance is an important and 
measurable facet of awareness, which has to be considered in each anosognosic 
patient (Fischer et al., 2004). Specificity means the degree to which lack of awareness 
is restricted to a particular deficit. A patient suffering from hemiplegia may fail to 
acknowledge the paralysis of his arm while (at the same time) recognising the motor 
deficit in his leg. An extraordinary example of specificity of anosognosia is reported 
by Ramachandran (1995), who describes a patient with AHP who refuses a box of 
candy saying “I am diabetic, doctor-I can’t eat candy. You should know that!” 
(Ramachandran, 1995, p. 25). In other words, this patient denies her paralysis while 
acknowledging her diabetes and the implications of this illness. 
The concept of partiality implies that unawareness of one’s deficit may be less than 
total and suggest that some implicit knowledge about the deficit may be present, 
even in severe form of anosognosia. Patients who deny illness but are willing to stay 
in hospital are not rare, which indicates that a kind of implicit awareness might be 
present. In their study, Nardone and colleagues presented a series of words, some of 
them associated with hemiplegia-related deficit, to a group of anosognosic patients 
and to a control group. They found that, in contrast to non-anosognosic patients, 
patients who deny the own hemiplegia take longer to respond to words concerning 
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paralysis (like “handicapped”), body part (like “arm”) or mobility (like “athletic”), 
finding support for the notion of an implicit knowledge. Increased latencies 
presumably result from the attempt of maintaining deficit-related thoughts outside 
from consciousness, a defence mechanism called “repression” by psychoanalytic 
psychologists (Nardone et al., 2007).  
 
The remarkable improvement of neuroimaging techniques allowed important 
advances in the understanding of this heterogeneous condition. However, none of 
the existing models offers an exhaustive explanation of anosognosia. The neural 
mechanism accounting for illness awareness – impaired in different forms of 
anosognosia – has to date not been identified and many questions remain 
unanswered. It is likely that each form of anosognosia involve a distinct 
pathogenesis, through this does not exclude some neural circuits common to all 
types of denial. 
 1.1 Anosognosia: the denial of illness 
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Table 1: Forms of anosognosia 
Authors, year Major form of anosognosia Description 
 
Babinski, 1914  
 
 
 
 
Anton, 1896  
 
 
 
 
Buxbaum et al., 
2004 
 
 
 
 
Starkstein et al., 
2006; Kristin and 
Robin, 2007   
 
 
 
Shuren et al., 1995   
 
 
 
 
Babinski, 1914 
 
 
 
 
Critchley, 1962 
 
Anosognosia for hemiplegia 
 
 
 
 
Anosognosia for cortical blindness  
“Anton syndrome” 
 
 
 
Anosognosia for neglect 
 
 
 
 
 
Anosognosia for memory impairment in 
Alzheimer’s disease 
 
 
 
 
Anosognosia for aphasia 
 
 
 
 
Anosodiaphoria 
 
 
 
 
Misoplegia 
 
Unawareness of hemiplegia 
Patient denies his paralysis, is 
unable to recognize his inability to move 
 
 
Lack of awareness of being blind 
Cortically blind patient affirms that he is 
able to see 
 
 
Lack of awareness of hemi spatial 
attentional deficit. Patient believe to 
equally explore both sides of space 
 
 
 
Patient fails to recognise his memory 
deficits and is unable to realistically 
judge his cognitive performance 
 
 
 
Unawareness of language impairment. 
Patient fails to acknowledge his speech 
errors 
 
 
Milder form of anosognosia. Patients 
verbally acknowledges his deficit but 
shows lack of interest to it 
 
 
Patient express hatred toward the 
affected limb, often accompanied by 
verbal or physical abuse 
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1.1.2 Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) 
Anosognosia for motor impairment in stroke patients is one of the most fascinating 
phenomena in clinical neurology. Patients suffering from AHP are convinced that 
their paretic or plegic limb functions normally; they overestimate their motor ability 
and sometimes produce implausible explanations, when confronted with an obvious 
failure to execute a required action. The lack of awareness of hemiplegia following an 
acute brain lesion is a temporary condition generally lasting from a few hours to a 
few days, although some rare cases of chronic anosognosia, lasting several weeks, are 
described in the literature (Cocchini et al., 2002). The main reason why AHP is the 
most studied form of anosognosia may be the ineffectiveness of rehabilitation during 
its presence. AHP is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, which can manifest 
itself in many different ways. As noted above, it can be quite specific: patients 
generally do not fail to recognize other disabilities, they do not overestimate other 
motor or cognitive own abilities. AHP may also selectively concern only one limb: 
arm plegia can be denied whereas leg paralysis acknowledged. Awareness is not a 
unitary phenomenon and, when assessing AHP, it is important to consider that lack 
of awareness of paralysis may dissociate from unawareness of its consequences, or 
from the inability to realistically estimate the outcome of one’s own motor 
performance (Marcel et al., 2004). In some cases, AHP might be accompanied by 
altered limb perception, leading to somatoparaphrenia (i.e. lack of ownership of a 
paralysed limb) or misoplegia (i.e. morbid dislike or hatred of paralysed limbs in 
patients with hemiplegia) (Critchley, 1962; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009 for an overview). 
 
Incidence 
 
In recent times, many researchers tried to determine the incidence of AHP in stroke 
patients. Probably as consequence of the different criteria used to diagnose 
anosognosia as well as differences in the time elapsed since stroke, these studies 
produced a wide variation of results (Orfei et al., 2007). Some investigators 
considered a patient’s failure to spontaneously report the motor deficit a sign 
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significant enough to diagnose AHP. Others have insisted that an extensive 
questioning about paresis or plegia would be indispensable for the diagnosis. 
Recently, a study conducted by Baier and Karnath (2005) on a sample of 128 patients 
indicates that, if a conservative cut-off criterion is applied for the diagnosis (i.e. direct 
questioning necessary), the incidence of AHP ranges from 10% to 18%. AHP can be 
classified as mild, medium or severe. Anosognosic denial is much more frequently 
observed following RH lesions. The study of Breier et al. (1995) was based on 
observations of anosognosia after intracarotid barbiturate injection. It showed that of 
the 37 patients, 89% exhibited anosognosia for hemiparesis after right-sided injection 
whereas only 49% after left-sided injection showed similar symptoms. Not 
surprisingly, anosognosia is equally frequent in male and female and no age-related 
difference has been evidenced (Pia et al., 2004). 
 
Anatomy 
 
Anosognosia is most frequently of a vascular aetiology. Typically, frontal, parietal or 
temporal cortical regions are damaged, but the disorder may also emerge in 
conjunction with subcortical lesions, most often affecting the basal ganglia and the 
thalamus (Pia et al., 2004). Berti and colleagues found that AHP is often associated 
with premotor and somatosensory cortex lesions, areas related to motor planning 
and execution (Berti et al., 2005).  
Other recent neuroimaging studies indicated the insular cortex as an important 
anatomical structure related to AHP. They show that this region is involved in self-
awareness, including movement awareness: the insular cortex is supposed to 
integrate input signals related to self-awareness about the functioning of body parts 
(Karnath et al., 2005). More specifically, the anterior insular cortex (AIC) seems to 
play a key-role in different aspects of self-awareness (Craig, 2009).  Its integrity is 
essential; it underlies the human capacity to be aware of the own person, and 
damage affecting this region – which some authors consider to represent the neural 
correlate of consciousness - may disrupt awareness and lead to anosognosic denial.  
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As previously mentioned, AHP is more often reported after right than after left 
hemisphere lesions (LH) (Pia et al., 2004). This clinical evidence has some 
implications for the lateralization of higher cognitive functions. Although some 
authors contend that the frequency of anosognosia in left brain damaged patients 
may have been underestimated due to aphasic symptoms often accompanying LH 
lesions (Cocchini et al., 2009), the majority agree that the RH is primarily dominant 
for an individual’s awareness of one’s own corporeal being and its relation to the 
environment and affective state (Devinsky, 2000). Several lines of evidence suggest 
that the RH plays a crucial role in the monitoring of one’s own physical, emotional 
and social self. Indeed, it is known that its injury may impair a series of functions 
related to self-awareness, among others the ability to recognize own illness. RH 
lesions cause also left-sided neglect, disordered ego boundaries, reduplicative 
delusions, topographic disorientation and various disorders of socially relevant 
behavior.   
Furthermore, adding support for the notion that self-awareness is a right lateralized 
function, some researchers found that RH inactivation with intracarotid amytal 
injection (Wada test) lead to higher prevalence of denial than LH inactivation. This 
finding strongly suggests that the monitoring of the source of agency over motor 
performance is predominantly a RH function (Adair et al., 1995; Gilmore et al., 1992). 
 
Diagnosis 
 
As anticipated above, when diagnosing AHP, three crucial aspects should be 
considered: the degree to which lack of awareness is restricted to a particular deficit 
(specificity), what kind of awareness is compromised (extension) and whether some 
implicit knowledge about the deficit is spared (partiality) (Marcel et al., 2004).  
The diagnosis of AHP is typically based, besides a clinical observation of the patient, 
on questionnaires (Bisiach et al., 1986; Feinberg et al., 2000). Both methods have the 
aim to measure the severity of the disorder and to describe anosognosia in terms of 
specificity, extension and partiality. Tables 2 and 3 show two frequently used scales 
to grade the severity of anosognosia in different ways.  
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Table 2: Bisiach’s Scale for the assessment of AHP (Bisiach et al., 1986) 
 
Grade 0 (no anosognosia): the disorder is spontaneously reported or mentioned by the patient 
following a general question about their complaints 
 
Grade 1: the disorder is repoted only following a specific question about the strength of the 
patient’s limbs 
 
Grade 2: the disorder is acknowledged only after demonstrations through routine techniques 
of neurological examination 
 
Grade 3: no acknowledgement of the disorder can be obtained 
 
 
Table 3: Anosognosia for hemiplegia questionnaire (Feinberg, 2000) 
 
1. “Do you have weakness anywhere?” 
2. “Is your arm causing you any problems?” 
3. “Does it feel normal?” 
4. “Can you use it as well as you used to?” 
5. “Are you fearful about losing your ability to use your arm?” 
6. “Is the sensation in your arm normal?” 
7. “The doctors tell me that there is some paralysis of your arm. Do you agree?” 
8. (Left arm is lifted and dropped in left hemispace.) “It seems there is some weakness.  
Do you agree?” 
9. (Left arm is lifted and dropped in right hemispace.) “It seems there is some weakness.  
Do you agree?” 
10. “Take your right arm, and use it to lift your left arm. Is there any weakness of your left 
arm?” 
 
Responses for each item were scored as 0 if the patient showed awareness of deficit; 0.5 for partial awareness; and 1.0 for 
complete unawareness or denial. The scores were summed to produce a total score on the scale ranging from 0 (no 
anosognosia) to 10 (maximum anosognosia). 
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Additionally, questions on bimanual tasks abilities are helpful for assessing 
awareness of the consequences of hemiplegia and allow to cover all facets of 
awareness (Nimmo-Smith et al., 2005). Fig. 1 (part A) shows a series of questions that 
can be use to quantify patient’s unawareness of inability to perform tasks requiring 
bilateral use of limbs. Typically, patients exhibiting severe anosognosia are not aware 
of the activity limitations of the affected limb, so when asked to predict own 
performance they overestimate own motor abilities.  
A comprehensive bedside examination should thus include both conventional 
generic questions (“what is wrong with you?”, “Is your arm causing you any 
problems?”) and questions involving imagined abilities (ideally one bimanual “how 
well could you in your present state tie a knot?” and one bipedal “how well could 
you jump?”). Generic questions and questions relating to imagined actions reflect 
different levels of unawareness of motor incapacity. Only if both are addressed will  
the examiner get information about the true extension of unawareness.  
Intriguing, evidence suggests that some patients show a dissociation within 
awareness, according to the viewpoint (1st or 3rd person) of the question (Marcel et 
al., 2004). The same patient may overestimate his abilities when asked how well he 
could perform a task in his current state (1st person perspective); whereas no 
overestimation is reported, if the same question is asked from a 3rd person 
perspective (i.e. “If I (experimenter) were in your present state, how well would I be 
able to jump, compared with my usual ability?”). This fact calls into question the role 
of motivation and self-protective mechanisms.  
Unfortunatly, the existing methods rely heavily on language, which may represent a 
problem when testing aphasic patients. To counter this problem, Della Sala and 
colleagues (2009) proposed a new tool, the VATAm (Visual-Analogue Test for 
Anosognosia for motor impairment). This test, which includes a 4-point visual-
analogue scale, is less dependent on language and overcomes limitations of previous 
assessment methods (see Fig. 1, part B).  
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 ‘‘In your present state how well, compared with your normal ability, can you… 
Bimanual tasks 
…tie a knot? 
…clap your hands?  
If you can do it as well as usual, say 
‘ten’’,  
‘‘If you cannot do it at all, say 
‘nought’.’’  
An estimate of 5 or more is counted as 
overestimation on that question. 
 
…shuffle cards? 
…row a boat? 
…unscrew bottle? 
Bipedal task 
…climb a ladder? 
…jump? 
 
Figure 1a: Bilateral tasks questions for assessing awareness of the consequences of hemiplegia 
(Nimmo-Smith et al., 2005) 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia for motor impairment (VATAm), Della Sala et al. 
(2009) 
Patient and two caregivers designate a score from 0 (no problem) to 3 (problem) to each question.  
A total score VATAm score is calculate by adding the scores from the 12 questions.  
The patient’s total rating is subtracted from that of their caregivers. 
The caregiver-patient discrepancy ranges from -36 to +36 and indicates the degree of anosognosia. 
Positive values indicate that the patient overestimates his motor abilities (i.e. anosognosia), a negative 
ones that he underestimates his motor abilities. 
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Below a typical examiner-patient conversation, illustrating a case of severe 
anosognosia  (Berti et al., 2007, pp. 173-174). 
 
E: Where are we?  
P: In the Hospital  
E: Which hospital?  
P: Somma Lombardo.  
E: Why are you in the hospital?  
P: Because I had a stroke. 
E: What is a stroke?  
P: I do not know.  
E: How is your left arm?  
P: Fine.  
E: Can you move it?  
P: Yes.  
E: Would you be able to raise your left arm up in the air?  
P: Yes, I would.  
E: Would you be able to lift the telephone receiver with your left hand?  
P: Yes, I would.  
E: Would you be able to open a bottle, using both your hands?  
P: Yes, I would.  
E: Would you be able to brush your hair handling the hairbrush with your left hand?  
P: Yes, I would.  
E: Would you be able to wash your face using both your hands?  
P: Yes, I would. (The patient was then asked to actually perform some movements.)  
E: Could you touch my hand with your right hand?  
P: (The patient does it without any problem.)  
E: Could you touch my hand with your left hand?  
P: (Although she seems to try the movements, she cannot raise the arm and reach the 
examiner’s hand. Nonetheless, after a while she says ‘Done.’)  
E: Have you done it?  
P: Yes, I think so.  
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E: Could you touch your left hand with your right hand?  
P: (She does it without problem, thus showing that the left personal neglect has 
vanished.)  
E: Could you open this bottle for me, please?  
P: (The patient attempts to do it using only the right hand.)  
E: Can you manage?  
P: No.  
E: Why?  
P: Because it does not open.  
E: How do you open a bottle?  
P: With one hand I hold the bottle, with the other I unscrew the cap. 
E: Are you doing it?  
P:Yes.  
E: Can you put your left hand on your left shoulder?  
P: Yes, I can.  
E: Then please do it.  
P: (the patient seems to try the movement: she also overtly looks at the left 
motionless 
arm and at the shoulder. After that, she looks at the examiner, as if she had finished 
performing the requested action). 
E: Have you done it?  
P: Yes, I think so. (The patient, on the wheelchair, is taken to the bathroom and 
placed in front of the basin.)  
E: Could you wash your face using both hands, please?  
P: (The patient takes the bottle of the liquid soap with the right hand and attempts to 
soap her left hand as if the left hand was actually over the basin, near the midline. 
However, the left hand was not there because it was lying on her lap. After having 
soaped the ‘ghostly’ hand, she started to move the right arm/hand forward and 
backward as if she was washing the two hands, one against the other. Finally, she 
washed the face using the right hand.) 
E: Are you washing both your hands?  
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P: Yes, I am.  
E: Are you washing your face?  
P: Yes, I am. 
E: With both hands?  
P: Yes, I think so. (Then the patient was asked to brush her hair handling the 
hairbrush with the left 
hand. The hairbrush was on the table and the left hand was lying motionless on the  
table as well. She took the hairbrush with the right hand and forced it below the left 
hand. While ‘holding’ the hairbrush with the left hand she moved the head as if she 
was actually brushing the hair. After a while, she looked at the examiner and seemed 
satisfied with her performance.) 
E: Have you done it?  
P: Yes, I have, but only on the left side. 
 
Theories of anosognosia 
 
Theoretical accounts of AHP continue to be the subject of controversies. Over the 
past fifty years, many models have been proposed to explain the disorder. However, 
to date, none of them is able to account fully and exhaustively for the phenomenon in 
its complexity and many issues still remain unresolved. Some of the most important 
theories are briefly reviewed here (Orfei et al., 2007).  
 
Early investigators focused on the role of motivation, assuming that AHP would 
result from a defence mechanism, preventing depressive feelings (Weinstein & Kahn, 
1955). Alternatively, other authors considered AHP to be caused by a proprioceptive 
loss and a general cognitive impairment (“discovery theory”, Levine et al., 1991). The 
discovery theory proposes that anosognostic patients are not able to recognize their 
paralysis because the sensory feedback that normally informs an individual about 
the position and movement of limbs is damaged.  
To date, the validity of these two theories (motivational and discovery theory) is 
questionned. The scientific community currently agrees that neither psychological 
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defense nor sensory and intellectual loss, are fully responsible for the genesis of 
anosognosia. Nonetheless, some authors admit that self-protective mechanisms and 
emotional reactions to functional loss may play some role for the emergence of the 
disorder (Turnbull et al., 2005). 
 
In 1965 Geschwind formulated the Interhemispheric disconnection hypothesis, 
hypothesizing that confabulations exhibited by anosognostic patients may result 
from a functional split between the hemispheres. This disconnection would prevent 
information collected by the RH (controlling the left side of the body and indeed 
recognizing the paralysis at some nonverbal level) from being transferred to the 
speech-dominant LH (Geschwind, 1965). 
 
The frequent association of neglect and anosognosia for motor loss following RH 
damage made some researchers conceive AHP as a secondary consequence of spatial 
or personal neglect (Cutting, 1978). However, later investigations demonstrated that 
AHP and neglect may dissociate, showing that AHP cannot be ascribed to the hemi-
attention syndrom (Bisiach et al., 1986).  
 
Still other authors suggested that AHP results from a failure to transfer new 
information from working memory into long-term memory. Patients suffering from 
AHP would fail to integrate observed motor impairments into their body self-image 
in long-term memory (Marcel et al., 2004; Starkstein et al., 1992). One has to 
emphasize, however, the clinical evidence that some patients with AHP display 
intact memory performance. If anything, the disorder seems to reflect a specific 
mnestic deficit rather than  a global memory impairment.  
 
Ramachandran hypothesized that AHP results from a functional interhemispheric 
imbalance. He speculated that the LH seeks to maintain the continuity of beliefs, 
tends to deny discrepancies, and uses confabulation, while the RH, in contrast, plays 
the role of a “devil’s advocate” and detects discrepancies (Ramachandran, 1994, 
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1995). After a RH lesion, the LH is supposed to be unsupervised, and anosognosia 
may be the consequence.  
Another line of reasoning proposes that AHP may be the result of an abnormal affect 
regulation (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Turnbull et al., 2005). It is hypothesized that a 
disruption in the generation of negative emotions, lateralized to the right (frontal) 
hemisphere, is responsible for unawareness of motor impairment.   
 
Several models focused on processes involved in motor planning and motor control. 
Among the pioneers of this approach, Heilman (1991) postulated the feed-forward 
model, which represents one of the most advanced models, later modified and 
improved by other researchers. This model assumes that the motor deficit of a limb is 
recognized when the brain detects a mismatch between an intended movement and 
the actual motor performance. A module comparing intended and observed 
movements notices discrepancies. Patients with AHP are unable to generate 
movement intention, therefore no mismatch is generated in the comparator module 
and the patient does not recognize his/her paresis. The core of this theory is that in 
AHP the inability to generate motor intention leads to a failure of expectation, which 
prevent the patient discovering that no movement has occurred.  
Berti and Pia (2006) proposed a modification of the Heilman’s (1991) hypothesis, 
assuming that in AHP the comparator module itself is deficient. Frith (2000) further 
posited that awareness of initiating a movement is based on a representation of the 
predicted consequences of making that movement. Patients with AHP think that 
they can move, because the representations of both desired and predicted positions 
of the limb - responsible for the experience of movement - are intact (Frith et al., 
2000).  
 
More recently, Fotopoulou and colleagues (2008) offered experimental evidence that 
altered awareness of action exhibited in AHP is caused by a dominance (and not by a 
loss, as previously hypothesized) of motor intention over sensory feedback. In their 
experiment, they manipulated motor intention and visual feedback of a movement 
(using a prosthetic rubber hand) in patients with AHP and in hemiplegic patients 
without anosognosia. This was done in order to assess whether the intention to move 
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one’s left hemiplegic hand influenced the perception of movement of that hand. The 
authors found that motor intention has a selective effect in the AHP group. Indeed, 
when patients with AHP were instructed to raise their left arm, thus having the 
intention to move (a “self-generated” condition), they were more likely than patients 
without AHP to falsely detect movement of a motionless rubber hand and to claim 
they had moved it (disregarding visual information).  This model postulates that 
AHP derives from a dominance of motor intention over any sensory feedback that 
would indicate a failure of movement.  
 
Models explaining anosognosia by altered intentionality or by the disruption of 
sensory-motor mechanisms recently received the largest agreement within the 
scientific community studying AHP. However, an abnormality in motor planning 
cannot explain all the features of AHP and certainly cannot account for anosognosia 
accompanying non-motor deficits.  
In particular, these models do not take into account the role of emotion and the 
relevance of a functional interhemispheric balance in generating motor awareness 
and in preventing confabulatory behavior, often exhibited in AHP (Ramachandran, 
1995; Turnbull et al., 2005). 
 
The most fascinating question emerging from the study of anosognosia is how the 
brain constructs a truthful image of one’s self and how he succeeds to constantly 
revised it, integrating health and illness. This disorder reminds us that self-awareness 
is a highly malleable concept, resulting from a construction performed daily by the 
human brain. 
 
There are currently no long-term treatments for anosognosia. As mentioned above, 
AHP is a temporary condition generally lasting from a few hours to a few days. In 
the majority of cases, anosognosia simply disappears over time. To date, only two 
experimental procedures has been shown to temporarily attenuated AHP: caloric 
vestibular stimulation (CVS) (Cappa et al., 1987) and, more recently, self-observation 
‘from the outside’ (from a 3rd person perspective) (Fotopoulou et al., 2009).  
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Caloric vestibular stimulation (CVS) 
CVS is a non-invasive technique traditionally used to test functionality of the 
vestibular system (Barany, 1906). The patient is oriented in a supine position with the 
head inclined 30° from the horizontal and cold or warm water  (+/- 7 degrees Celsius 
from body temperature) is irrigated into the external auditory canal first of one, then 
of the other ear (Fitzgerald & Hallpike, 1942). This procedure creates a temperature 
gradient across the semicircular canals, altering the density of the endolymphatic 
fluid contained in the labyrinth. This mimics the endolymph movement normally 
induced by head turning and gives the subject the illusion of movement (see Figure 
2). Two important parameters indicate the functionality of the vestibular system: the 
presence of nystagmus (i.e. quick horizontal involuntary, rhythmic eye movements) 
and subjective dizziness and nausea. Nystagmus usually appears after 10-20 sec after 
irrigation starts, and eye movements are recorded using an infrared camera.  The 
absence of nystagmus indicates vestibular weakness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Principle of CVS  
Irrigating cold or warm water (+/- 7° from body temperature) creates a temperature gradient across 
the semicircular canals, altering the density of the endolymphatic fluid and giving the illusion of 
movement.  
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Recent neuroimaging findings indicated that CVS activates primarily the parieto-
insular cortex, which is considered the ‘core region’ of the multisensory vestibular 
cortex (Guldin & Grüsser, 1998). Cold-water irrigation activates predominantly brain 
regions contralateral to the stimulated ear, whereas warm-water rather activates the 
ipsilateral hemisphere. Furthermore, a recent PET study indicated that there is a 
dominance for vestibular cortical function in the non-dominant hemisphere (for 
right-handers the RH) (Dieterich et al., 2003). Figure 3 depicts this situation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Relative strength of heminspheric activation induced by cold-water CVS in a typical 
right-hander 
Beyond classical neurological investigations, this technique has been more recently 
exploited as a tool in the cognitive neurosciences, to explore hemispheric 
lateralization of cognitive functions in healthy individuals. For instance, Bächtold et 
al. (2001) investigated the effects of unilateral cold-water vestibular stimulation on 
spatial and verbal memory performance. Applying CVS during the encoding phase, 
they found better spatial-recall in participants stimulated in the left ear, and better 
verbal-recall in those stimulated in the right ear, as a result from temporary 
activation of cerebral structures contralateral to the stimulated ear. Other 
experiments evidenced that CVS modulates the phenomenon of binocular rivalry 
(BR) with ambiguous figures, demonstrating that this method activates neural 
mechanisms underlying perception (Miller et al., 2000).  
Several studies demonstrated that ear irrigation with cold or warm water has an 
effect on a range of clinical conditions, among those neglect, anosognosia, 
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somatoparaphrenia, mood disorder and phantom limb perception (Miller & Ngo, 
2007). 
Using warm- and iced-water CVS, Cappa et al. (1987) induced a temporary remission 
of anosognosia in two out of four patients suffering from AHP. Fifteen minutes after 
the stimulation, a previously completely anosognosic patient appeared to recognize 
his own motor impairment, affirming „I don‘t know why, I have always been able to 
move them, but now they are blocked: it is as if my brain is no longer able to 
command them“ (Cappa et al., 1987, p. 780).  Similarly, CVS induced temporary 
remission of somatoparaphrenic delusions in a patient convinced that her arm 
belonged to her mother (Bisiach et al., 1991). In both cases (anosognosia and 
somatoparaphrenia) the reported reduction of delusion was temporary and lasted 
just a few hours.  
Self-observation ‘from the outside’ 
More recently, Fotopoulou et al. (2009) reported the case of a patient with severe 
AHP, who recovered instantly and permanently when viewing herself in a video 
replay. In this patient, anosognosia did not reappear, and the video-exposure 
therefore revealed itself as therapeutic. As soon as the video stopped, the patient 
spontaneously commented: “I have not been very realistic”. Examiner (E): “What do 
you mean?” Patient (P): “I have not been realistic about my left-side not being able to 
move at all”. E: What do you think now?” P: “I cannot move at all”. E: “What made 
you change your mind?” P: “The video. I did not realize I looked like this” 
(Fotopoulou et al., 2009, p. 1258) The authors argued that self-observation in videos 
and mirrors may bring about profound alterations in self awareness and that off-line 
self-observation may be spared in some patients.  
 
  
 22
1.2 Unrealistic optimism  
1.2 Unrealistic optimism (UO) 
Optimism and positive illusions  
 
The word “optimism” derived from the Latin optimus, superlative of bonus (= good), 
meaning best. In the typical sense of the word, being optimistic means “expect the 
best possible outcome”. A useful definition is offered by anthropologist Lionel Tiger, 
which defined optimism as “a mood or attitude associated with an expectation about 
the social or material future – one which the evaluator regards as socially desirable, 
to his [or her] advantage, or for his [or her] pleasure” (Tiger, 1979, p. 18).   
In the literature, two conceptualisations of optimism are described: optimism as a 
personality trait, so-called dispositional optimism (i.e. a global expectation that more 
good things than bad will happen in the future) (Scheier et al., 1994) and optimism as 
an explanatory style (i.e. tendency to explain negative events by attributing the cause 
of these to external, specific factors; ex. attributing the failure of an exam to the 
wrong questions that came up) (Seligman, 1990). 
In the late 1970s, some cognitive psychologists started accumulating evidence that 
psychologically healthy people are positively biased: for example, when speaking or 
writing, people tend to use more positive than negative words, they recall positive 
things sooner than negative ones, they evaluate themselves more positively than they 
evaluate others (Matlin & Stang, 1978). Taylor and colleagues argued that people’s 
perceptions are optimistically biased and that human thinking is characterised by a 
robust positive bias, which promotes psychological well-being (Taylor & Brown, 
1994). In fact, positive illusions are usually absent in people suffering from anxiety or 
depression, who display a more realistic or a pessimistic perception of the reality 
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979).  
A growing number of studies focused on the origin of positive illusions as well as on 
their impact on physical and mental health.  
Evidence from a variety of sources suggests that optimism is an inherent and highly 
beneficial psychological characteristic of human nature, linked to good mood and 
physical health. Tiger conceptualizes optimism as one of the most adaptive 
characteristic of human nature. He suggested that optimism pervades people’s 
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anticipation of the future and counteracts the fear linked to the anticipation of death, 
serving therefore an evolutionary function (Tiger, 1979).  
Many studies indicated that optimism and positive illusions promote physical and 
psychological well-being. To this end, a recent study identified a relationship 
between optimistic expectancies and cell-mediated immunity (Segerstrom & 
Sephton, 2010). Optimistic expectancies of 124 law students were assessed with the 
use of a scale, including a range of cognitive expectancies (ex. “I will be less 
successful than most of my classmates”).  Cell-mediated immunity (CMI) was 
measured by intradermal injection of DTH antigen preparation in each participant.   
Within people, changes in optimistic expectancies were accompanied by changes in 
immunity. Some authors noted that dispositional optimism predicts better resistance 
to viral disease and cancer (Allison et al., 2003; Ironson et al., 2005). 
Unrealistically positive views of the self, exaggerated perceptions of personal control 
and UO are some of the most studied positive illusions. These illusions serve a 
mental-health-promoting function and possibly make the world a “warmer and more 
active and beneficent place in which to live” (Taylor & Brown, 1988).    
 
The future will be great, especially for me (Taylor & Brown, 1988) 
 
UO refers to the common tendency of healthy people to systematically underestimate 
the likelihood that they will experience future misfortune, including illness 
(Weinstein, 1984; Weinstein, 1989). Weinstein originally reported this phenomenon. 
In his study, he observed that participants estimated their own chances of 
experiencing a variety of pleasant events, such getting a good salary or having a 
gifted child, as higher than those of their peers and their chance of experiencing 
negative events, such as contracting HIV infection or developing a drinking problem, 
as lower than the chances of their peers (Weinstein, 1980).  
This mistaken belief is also designated with the term of “optimistic bias” or “illusion 
of invulnerability”. As with many other kinds of positive illusions, UO is widespread 
and robust. Although most work focusing on the illusion of invulnerability related to 
health problems, this phenomenon is likely to emerge for a wide variety of positive 
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and negative events, independent of age and socioeconomic status of the sample 
(Fischer & Chalmers, 2008). 
The tendency to view oneself as less likely than others in becoming ill or, more 
generally, to experiencing negative events is modulated by a series of factors. In the 
foreground are the motivational ones, in particular the need to protect self-esteem 
and to cope with unpredictability of life.  Reducing anxiety, UO serves, like other 
positive illusions, a health-promoting function. This absence might indicate a bad 
affective state ("depressive realism") (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) or signal the presence 
of hypochondria (Barsky et al., 2001).  
 
Optimistic attitudes are more likely to emerge from events that are perceived as 
controllable (Klein & Helweg-Larsen, 2002) and/or severe.  Instead, illnesses previous 
experienced by the person usually lead to smaller bias (Weinstein, 1989).  Besides 
motivational causes, positive illusions are encouraged and maintained by a series of 
cognitive errors. For example, the common tendency to compare themselves with a 
stereotype of a high-risk individual may also account for UO and induces to estimate 
its own risk factors as smaller than those of the peer-person to whom we are 
comparing (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Weinstein, 1989). Furthermore, when asked 
to compare their risk to that of others people, we tend to focus more on our own risk 
factors than on those of the peers, which result in a biased comparison (Chambers & 
Windschitl, 2004).  
 
Although dispositional optimism is usually advantageous, it is important to notice 
that unrealistic biases can in some situations even be unfavourable. UO can lead to 
false beliefs that “all will be fine” and be associated with risky behavior (Dillard et al., 
2009). We conclude therefore, as suggested by Sweeny and colleagues (2006, p. 305) 
that “People should be optimistic enough to take advantage of the many benefits of a 
positive outlook, but they should also sufficiently temper that optimism so that they 
can motivate preventative action and avoid being caught off guard”.  
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Measurement 
 
One of the most popular tests for measuring dispositional optimism is the Life 
orientation test (LOT-R) (Scheier et al., 1994).  
The attributional style questionnaire (ASQ) is based on the explanatory style 
definition of optimism. It lists positive and negative events and asks the participants  
to record a possible cause for the event (Peterson et al., 1982). Two methods are 
commonly used to establish unrealistic bias: the direct method and the indirect method. 
Using the direct method, a person is asked to estimate his risk relative to that of the 
average person of his age and sex on a scale that ranges from “below average” to 
“above average”. If the mean response is lower than the midpoint one has 
demonstrated an optimistic bias.  
Another approach is the so-called indirect method, which consists of asking the 
participant to make two judgments – an estimate of his own risk and an estimate of 
the risk of the average peer. These ratings will be subtracted, and if the mean 
difference is not zero, a bias exists. These methods are simple and widely used, 
however, they present some limits. Although they are effective to establish biases at a 
group level, they sometimes fail when trying to identify individual biases. In fact, a 
man who estimates his risk of lung cancer to be below average may be accurate if he 
has no risk factors for lung cancer. That is why it is necessary to develop new method 
able to accurately quantify optimistic bias at the individual level. 
 
Behavioral and neural correlates of UO 
 
In the last decades, researchers have mainly explored cognitive and motivational 
factors that contribute to unrealistic optimism.  In this section, we will review some of 
the few studies interested in the brain processes underlying this widespread positive 
illusion.  
 In an experiment conducted in 1984, Drake found that participants induced to orient 
toward the right indicated greater personal optimism for future life events than those 
induced to orient toward the left (Drake, 1984). 
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A few years later, Drake & Ulrich (1992) exploited the line bisection task as measure of 
functional hemisphere predominance, to explore lateralization of unrealistic 
optimism. They asked 22 females and 28 males to bisect horizontal lines, after 
assessing their personal optimism degree.  They found that the degree of line-
bisecting error to the right - taken as a measure of LH predominance - was 
significantly related to the degree of personal optimism and that greater rightward 
bisecting errors predict greater optimism.  
Drake’s findings are in line with the theory of valence-dependent hemispheric 
processing of emotions, suggesting positive emotions to be primarily processed by 
anterior regions of the LH, while corresponding areas of the RH preferentially deal 
with negative stimuli (Davidson & Sutton, 1995). They also indicate that the cerebral 
hemispheres contribute to positive illusions in an asymmetrical manner. 
In fact, observing clinical populations, we note that, as a rule, damage to anterior 
regions of the LH induces depression or even elicits “catastrophic reactions,” while 
comparable damage to the RH may rather lead to enhanced positive mood, 
anosodiaphoria (i.e. marked downplaying of the consequences of an illness) and 
euphoric reactions (Davidson & Sutton, 1995; Gainotti, 1972; Silberman & 
Weingartner, 1986).  
Clinical evidence and several research findings suggest that human cerebral 
hemispheres are asymmetrical involved in maintaining positive illusions and in 
particular, that UO results from LH relative dominance. 
  
More recently, Sharot and colleagues conducted a neuroimaging study with the aim 
of elucidating how the brain generates an optimistic bias (Sharot et al., 2007). They 
analyzed functional magnetic resonance imaging scans from 15 young adults. During 
scanning, participants were invited to imagine emotionally arousing events like “the 
end of a romantic relationship” or “graduating”. After the scanning session, subjects 
also completed an optimism scale. They found that when people imagined positive 
future events the activity in the rostral anterior cingulated cortex (rACC) and in the 
amygdala were most strongly correlated. Furthermore, they found that more 
optimistic people showed greater rACC activation when imagining positive versus 
 27
1.2 Unrealistic optimism  
negative future events than did less optimistic individuals. In other words, the rACC 
activation for positive events correlated with trait optimism. They concluded that 
these two regions are crucially involved in the tendency to engage in the projection of 
positive future events and speculate they could represent a possible brain basis for 
optimism.  The results of this study are supported by findings from functional and 
structural neuroimaging of mood disorders: depressed patients showed in fact 
reduced volume and metabolism in the same subregion of the rACC that Sharot’s 
group found correlated with optimism (Drevets, 2000).  
 
Despite the growing interest toward the possible neural mechanism underlying 
positive illusions, at the present time, the neural basis for UO remains an open 
question. 
We know, as pointed out by Sharot, that a malfunction of a neural pathway 
incorporating the rACC and the amygdala may cause depression (Drevets et al., 1997). 
However, if on one side, these regions may play a role in attention towards positive 
future events and away from negative ones, on the other side, a number of studies 
with clinical and healthy populations evidenced asymmetrical hemispheric 
involvement in emotions and positive illusions. Following these studies, UO would be 
mediated by LH mechanism.  
 
UO: a prospective anosognosia 
 
In our contributions (Chapter 2) we conceptualize UO regarding future health as a 
form of "prospective anosognosia", i.e. the non-pathological denial of health risks. 
We suggest that the evaluative process which enable healthy people to appraise their 
current physical and mental functioning and to detect dysfunction (i.e. nosognosia) is 
markedly biased towards an overly positive evaluation.  We assume that a degree of 
anosognosia concerning one’s own risk of future harm is normal and healthy and 
speculate that a qualitative similarity underspins anosognosic denial and nosognosic 
optimism. Proposing UO as a form of prospective anosognosia characterising the 
normal human functioning, we do not attempt to reduce anosognosia to a mere 
pathological exaggeration of unrealistic optimism; nonetheless, we believe that a 
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similar neural mechanism underly healthy positive illusions and clinical 
anosognosia.   
The recognition of a similarity between these two manifestations may open up new 
research avenues to the aim of identify the neural basis of anosognosia and 
optimism.  
Our results on UO (reported in Chapter 2) emphasize the importance of an 
interhemispheric interaction to a realistic appraisal of one’s self, being compatible 
with Ramachandran’s model of anosognosia (Ramachandran, 1995).  In his model, he 
identified the LH as the propagator of a healthy, normal image of the self and 
ascribed the right hemisphere the role of a "devil's advocate", which would detect 
any anomaly threatening this image.  
Our findings in the context of optimism highlight the asymmetric involvement of the 
LH and RH in emotion regulation and self-evaluation and confirm the positive 
association between LH activity and positive emotions. 
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1.3 Brain lateralization of emotional processing 
1.3.1 Four main theories 
Emotion has not always been a popular topic for neuroscientists, in the same way we 
know it today. Thirty years ago the majority of studies focused on cognition, with 
relatively little research addressing emotion. Interest in emotion has increased 
exponentially during the last forty years, giving raise to a new discipline called 
“affective neuroscience” (Davidson & Sutton, 1995). Nowadays, the study of emotion 
has become a crucial target of research, essential for understanding a broad range of 
brain mechanisms.  
During the past forty years, the field of affective neuroscience has debated the 
question of how the brain is organized to process emotions. More recently, 
technological advances such as dense-array electroencephalography (EEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have allowed this investigation to 
more precisely identify the neural circuits that are involved in the experience of 
emotion and motivation. The two halves of the brain are considered to play different 
roles in emotional processing, but the specific contribution of each hemisphere 
continues to be debated. 
I would like to emphasize the fact that the neural basis underlying behavioral 
complexity of emotion involves the entire nervous system. The experience of emotion 
relies on an intricate neural network, which involves different structures, among 
which the most important are prefrontal regions, cingulate gyrus, amygdala, 
hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, thalamus, hippothalamus, fornix (forming 
the “limbic system”), ventral tegmental area and septum. It is important to stress that 
all these structures interconnect intensively and none of them is solely responsible 
for any specific emotional state. However, some contribute more than others to this 
or that kind of emotion. 
Many methods have been used for assessing the involvement of cerebral 
hemispheres in the processing of emotions. One of the earliest and most used 
methods is the divided visual field technique, introduced by Mishkin and Forgays in 
the fifties (1952). More recently, modern neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI, 
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magnetoencephalography (MEG), EEG, and positron emission tomography (PET), 
have also permitted scientists to establish correlations between neurophysiologic 
activities and brain lateralization of emotional processing. 
 
This chapter does not represent an exhaustive review of the huge literature dedicated 
to the study of emotion, nor will it provide a solid description of the neural pathways 
generating the affective experience. In the following pages, I will introduce the main 
theories concerning the cortical lateralization of emotional processing, providing a 
selection of findings from behavioral, EEG and fMRI studies.  
 
The right hemisphere model 
 
The right-hemisphere hypothesis posits that the RH is specialized for the perception, 
expression and experience of emotion, regardless of valence (Borod et al., 1998). 
Representing the oldest theory on brain asymmetry, it states that the LH is associated 
with cognitive processes, whereas the RH is rather concerned with emotional 
processing.  
Early observations of a direct association between emotion processing and the RH 
were made nearly hundreds years ago.  Subsequently, the RH hypothesis received 
further support by many behavioral and neuroimaging studies, which confirmed his 
validity. First of all, some studies indicated RH superiority for facial affect 
perception; this evidence led a group of researchers to argue that the RH may contain 
a “store of facial emotion representations” (Bowers & Heilman, 1984). Considerable 
experimental evidence supports this hypothesis. Tachistoscopic studies with healthy 
participants have demonstrated left visual field (RH) superiority for discriminating 
emotional faces (Landis et al., 1979). Studies of patients with unilateral cerebral 
lesions showed that patients with right-hemisphere damages perform worse than 
those with left-hemisphere lesions on tasks requiring the recognition or the 
discrimination of facial affect (Adolphs et al., 1996; Cicone et al., 1980). Further 
evidence comes from patients with split-brain syndrome. Benowitz and colleagues 
(1983) reported the case of a split-brain patient, who had no difficulty identifying 
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facial expressions when presented to the RH, but failed to identify the same facial 
expressions when presented to the LH. In a study using intracarotid sodium amytal 
injection, Ahern and colleagues (1991) found that affective faces are rated as less 
emotionally intense when shown to the anesthetized RH; conversely, this effect was 
not observed when faces were shown to the anesthetized LH. In addition, 
neuroimaging studies and electrophysiological recording lend support to this view. 
For instance, Narumoto and colleagues (2001) found that selective attention to facial 
emotion specifically enhanced activity within the right superior temporal sulcus, 
compared with attention to the face without regard to emotion. 
In a review of seven studies involving brain-damaged patients, Borod (1993) 
indicated that patients with right brain damage are more frequently impaired in the 
expression of emotional prosody. Similarly, EEG studies found evidence of relative 
RH activation when participants were asked to generate emotional imagery (Karlin 
et al., 1979).  
Emotional disorders have also been linked to increased activity of the RH. Mania has 
historically been associated with right anterior lesions (Gainotti, 1972) and Heller 
(1993) suggested depressive states to be associated with relatively increased right 
versus left anterior activity, but decreased right posterior activity.  
 
The valence model 
 
In contrast to studies which support overall RH dominance for perception and 
modulation of emotions, the valence model suggests that positive emotions are 
primarily processed by anterior regions of the LH, while corresponding areas of the 
RH preferentially deal with threatening, negative stimuli (Davidson & Sutton, 1995; 
Kinsbourne, 1978). The first line of evidence in favour of a valence-dependent 
hemispheric processing of emotions derives from clinical investigations of patients 
with unilateral brain damage. Damage to (anterior) regions of the LH often induces 
negative affect or depression, while comparable damage to the RH generally lead to 
enhanced positive mood, euphoric reactions or anosognosia for own disabilities 
(Gainotti, 1972). Patients with RH lesions have more difficulty perceiving negative 
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versus positive emotion, whereas the perception of happy affective faces remains 
usually intact (Borod et al., 1997). A further demonstration of different emotional 
responses from the hemispheres comes from observation of patients undergoing the 
Wada test. Early intracarotid sodium amytal injection studies showed that injection 
at the left carotid artery induced “catastrophic reaction”, leaving the subject to worry 
about the future, whereas injection at the right carotid artery produced euphoric 
reactions and sense of well-being (Silberman & Weingartner, 1986). Mood changes 
are supposed to result from the release of one hemisphere from inhibitory influences 
of the contralateral hemisphere: the RH, when not counterbalanced, would produce 
depression, while the unbalanced LH would produce euphoria. A study on a group 
of 150 patients experiencing visual hallucinations revealed that hallucinations are 
experienced as emotionally negative when occurring in the left visual field (LVF), 
while those in the right visual field (RVF) are of predominantly positive content 
(Walters et al., 2006).  
Another strong support derives from research in animals. In fact, many studies 
demonstrated that across a vast range of species, threatening information appears 
more salient, when detected on the left of the animal's body (RH), whereas approach 
behavior is rather directed to the right side (LH). For instance, a horses' sensitivity to 
threat is larger when the aversive stimulus is presented on the left than on the right 
side (Austin & Rogers, 2007). Tail-wagging in dogs is modulated by the affective 
valence of the eliciting cue: right-biased for familiar stimuli such as the dog's owner 
and left-biased for threatening stimuli such as an unknown person or a dominant 
unfamiliar dog (Quaranta et al., 2007). Primate studies revealed a larger RH than LH 
arousal by the view of specifically aggressive acts (Parr & Hopkins, 2000). Even in 
reptilians and amphibia, lateral space seems to be associated with opposite emotive 
connotations; in toads, tongue protrusions are more frequently directed to the right 
during predatory behavior, but to the left when they signal agonistic acts 
(Vallortigara et al., 1998). Also early divided visual field studies in healthy subjects 
supported the valence model. Reuter-Lorenz and colleagues (1983) found that happy 
faces are identified quicker when presented within the RVF (LH), whereas sad faces 
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within the LVF (RH). Another study showed that chimeric faces were more likely to 
be judged as positive when presented within the RVF (Natale et al., 1983).  
However, results from lateralized tachistoscopic experiments are quite 
heterogeneous and only some of them produced support for the valence theory of 
emotional hemispheric processing (see the review by Habib, 1998). A variant of the 
valence theory postulates the existence of hemispheric specialization as a function of 
valence only for the expression of emotion (LH for positive and RH for negative 
emotions), whereas it considers the perception of both positive and negative affective 
stimuli to be a right cerebral function (Davidson, 1984). 
 
The approach-withdrawal model  
 
The approach-withdrawal model posits the existence of two separate systems of 
motivation and emotion—an approach and withdrawal systems (Davidson, 1992, 
1998). These two systems are considered to be responsible for individual differences 
in reactivity to emotional stimuli, or “affective styles.” With regard to this model, 
approach and withdrawal systems involve separate neural circuits of the frontal 
cortex. Emotions associated with approach behaviors (like happiness) are processed 
within left-anterior brain regions, whereas those associated with withdrawal 
behaviors (like fear) are processed within right-anterior regions. It is important to 
note that the prefrontal cortex is considered to be only one element of the approach 
and withdrawal systems . Other structures, in particular the basal ganglia and 
amygdala, are also believed to play crucial roles. Most positive emotions (like joy or 
pleasure) elicit approach behavior, whereas most negative emotions (like fear, 
disgust or shame) elicit withdrawal behavior. This is why this model is very similar 
to the valence model. Nonetheless, they disagree on the classification of the emotion 
of anger. Unlike other negative emotions, anger induces approach behavior.    
Many studies provide empirical evidence supporting the approach-withdrawal 
model. For instance, Davidson and colleagues (Davidson et al., 1990) showed 
participants video recordings designed to elicit an approach (happiness) or 
withdrawal (disgust) emotion, and collected behavioral and EEG data corresponding 
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to the stimuli. They found that the disgusting film was associated with a significant 
shift toward greater right relative to left frontal and anterior temporal arousal. 
Similarly, Coan and colleagues (2001) found that the production of withdrawal-
related faces (e.g., fear, disgust) were associated with relatively less left frontal 
activation (as recorded via EEG).  
A study conducted by Fox and colleagues (1995) demonstrated a relationship 
between resting frontal asymmetry and affective style. These authors correlated 
baseline frontal EEG asymmetry with social and interactive behaviors among forty-
eight four-year-old children during free play. They found that children who 
exhibited greater left frontal arousal displayed greater social competence (e.g., 
approach behavior, social initiation and positive affect), while those exhibiting 
greater right frontal arousal evidenced greater social withdrawal (e.g. withdrawal 
behavior,  social isolation).  
This relationship has also found support in the adult population (Davidson, 1992a, 
1992b, 1993; Davidson & Sutton, 1995). Studies of frontal asymmetry associated with 
feelings of anger have provided important experimental data in support of this 
model. Harmon-Jones & Allen (1998) demonstrated significant relationship between 
dispositional approach motivation elicited by anger and the anterior asymmetry in 
alpha activity. They found that dispositional anger is positively associated with left-
anterior cortical activity but negatively associated with right-anterior cortical activity. 
Taken together, consistent findings from several studies suggest that the anterior 
asymmetry in cortical activity may reflect motivational direction rather than affective 
valence and confirm the validity of this model. 
 
The behavioral activation and inhibition (BAS/BIS) model 
 
The Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) 
have been conceptualized as two neural motivational systems that regulate 
sensitivity to punishment and reward, respectively (Gray, 1990). This model posits 
that behavior and affect are controlled by activation of these two general 
motivational systems. Gray's model of emotion is based on evidence mostly from 
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animal research supporting independent neurobiological mechanisms for these two 
systems. The appetitive system (BAS) activates behavior in response to signals of 
reward and nonpunishment, whereas the aversive system (BIS) inhibits behavior in 
response to signals of punishment and nonreward. Activation of the BAS is 
associated with positive feelings and approach behaviors, whereas activation of the 
BIS is associated with feelings of anxiety and avoidance behaviors (Gray, 1990). The 
BAS is predominantly mediated by dopaminergic pathways emanating from the 
ventral tegmental area to the nucleus accumbens and ventral striatum, while the BIS 
is controlled by serotonergic pathways from the raphe nucleus to septo-hippocampal 
systems (Depue & Iacono, 1989; Nothen et al., 1992).  
 
Imbalance in BIS and BAS levels has been reported to be related to various forms of 
psychopathology (Scholten et al., 2006). Depression and mania appear to be 
associated with opposite BIS vs BAS profiles, stronger BIS than BAS in depression 
and stronger BAS than BIS in mania (Meyer et al., 1999). BAS activation is associated 
with positive feelings such as hope, whereas BIS activation is associated with 
negative feelings such as fear and anxiety, which induce freezing behavior. EEG 
technologies have allowed quantification of BAS and BIS lateralization strength. 
Recent EEG findings indicate that left and right frontal activity may reflect strength 
of the behavioral activation and behavioral inhibition systems, assessed using self-
reported questionnaires. Persons with higher BAS scores display increased left 
frontal activation, whereas greater right frontal activation is evidenced in individuals 
with higher BIS scores (Allen et al., 2004; Sutton & Davidson, 1997). Interindividual 
frontal EEG arousal asymmetries related to differences in BIS and BAS levels has 
been confirmed by a number of studies.  
 
The BIS/BAS scales are a cost- and time-effective instrument used to assess 
individual trait differences in human BIS and BAS levels (Carver & White, 1994). 
They measure self-reported predispositions toward positive (approach) and negative 
(withdrawal) affect in response to generally rewarding or threatening situations. The 
questionnaire asks respondents to answer seven BIS-related questions (e.g., “I feel 
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worried when I think I have done poorly at something”), five BAS-reward 
responsiveness questions (e.g., “When I get something I want, I feel excited and 
energized”), four BAS-drive questions (e.g., “When I want something, I usually go 
all-out to get it”), and four BAS–fun seeking questions (e.g., “I will often do things for 
no other reason than that they might be fun”). The score reflects intraindividual BIS 
and BAS strenght, which is thought to be stable over time. 
Diego and colleagues (2001) investigated the relationship between interaction style, 
EEG frontal asymmetry and BIS/BAS scores in sixty depressed mothers. They found 
that withdrawn and intrusive depressed mothers exhibit contralateral anterior brain 
activity and have opposite Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Approach profiles as 
reflected by BIS/BAS scale scores.  
1.3  Brain lateralization of emotional processing 
1.3.2 Open questions 
Despite the new findings provided by many behavioral and lesion studies and the 
extensive progress made during the last four decades, our understanding of the 
cortical and subcortical lateralization of emotional processing is far from complete, 
and an enormous heterogeneity characterizes the results.  
The valence model and the more recent approach-withdrawal hypothesis are similar 
and have received, over the last decades, the strongest support (Demaree et al., 2005). 
The BIS/BAS model is basically identical to the approach-withdrawal model but 
focuses on stable emotional traits (BIS and BAS strength) instead of states. Unlike the 
valence model, the BIS/BAS takes into account a relevant aspect of the evolution in 
which emotions are closely associated to the behavior of the individual in its 
environment. This model appears to be a better fit for the majority of data (e.g., 
anger). 
Neuroimaging studies have supported the idea that the prefrontal cortex is a region 
of high affective asymmetry (Davidson & Sutton, 1995): the anterior portion of the 
LH is related to approach behaviors and positive affects, whereas the anterior region 
of the RH is associated with withdrawal behavior and negative affects. The left 
orbitofrontal areas are especially responsive to reward, whereas areas in the right 
orbitofrontal cortex are more involved during punishment (O'Doherty et al., 2001). 
In contradiction to early models (Gainotti, 1972), the “dominance” of one hemisphere 
for emotional processing – as for other specific functions - is nowadays considered as 
relative and not absolute. Recent neuroimaging studies showed that small regions 
rather than whole hemispheres should be taken into account, when exploring 
lateralization of emotion. Although the investigaton of brain asymmetry associated 
with affective experience relies today on a more sophisticated level of anatomic 
specificity, it focuses mainly on the lateralization at a cortical level. Nonetheless, the 
contemplation of asymmetrical subcortical contributions to emotional processing is a 
critical aspect, often been disregarded, which should be incorporated to present 
cortical models (Gainotti et al., 1993). This would offer a more comprehensive 
appraisal of the brain basis of emotion as an experience that involves the whole 
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brain. It is also important to remember that an emotional experience is a multifacet 
phenomenon, which involves at least two dimensions along two axes: valence 
(negative to positive) and arousal (low to high). Demaree and colleagues (2005) 
proposed a “three-factor” model, suggesting a third dimension called “dominance”, 
a feelings of control over events versus feeling of being controlled.  
Future studies should consider all different facets of the affective experience: pattern 
of brain asymmetry associated with valence, arousal and dominance need to be 
clarified and analysis of anatomic specificity should be put in the foreground. This 
would allow a better understanding of how activation of anterior brain regions 
produce different emotional experiences. 
1.4 Goals of the present thesis 
1.4 Goals of the present thesis 
Study 1  
 
The clinical evidence reviewed above (section 1.1) suggests the existence of 
functional hemispheric asymmetries in the appraisal of one’s own illness. We have 
complained that the current research in anosognosia is too unilaterally focused on 
work with patients and the concept too much based solely on the dysfunctional 
aspects. We have reviewed the literature on unrealistic optimism in healthy persons 
and suggested to conceive this phenomenon as a form of “prospective anosognosia”. 
The goal of study 1 is to test the validity of this proposal. Specifically, we aimed at 
investigating whether a physiological manipulation known to alleviate anosognosia 
in neurological patients (i.e. vestibular stimulation), would also reduce healthy 
participants’ illusion of invulnerability to illness.  
 
Study 2 and 3 
 
A broad range of different experimental paradigms (reviewed in section 2.2) suggests 
a biological foundation of the association between lateral space exploration and the 
processing of emotional valence. However, the modulation of perception and 
exploration of space by emotional states and traits has produced mixed results.  
While the purpose of study 2 is to examine perception of emotional stimuli as a 
function of interindividual differences in hemispatial attention, the purpose of study 
3 is to manipulate hemispatial biases by a temporary induction of an emotional state.    
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2.1 Nosognosia and unrealistic optimism 
2.1.1 Study 1: Vestibular stimulation reduces unrealistic optimism  
Tamagni, C., Palla, A., Krummenacher, P., Vitacco, D., Huberle, E., Straumann, D., 
Hegemann, S., McKay, R., Brugger, P. (Nature Precedings, 2010) 
 
Abstract 
 
UO refers to the tendency of healthy people to underestimate their risk of future 
misfortune. Just as left-ear caloric irrigation (CI) attenuates anosognosia (denial of 
manifest illness) in clinical patients, we found that it also reduces UO about future 
health risks in healthy individuals. This finding demonstrates asymmetric 
hemispheric involvement in emotion regulation and self-evaluation, and suggests 
that a similar neuropsychological process underpins anosognosia and healthy 
optimism. 
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Introduction 
 
UO refers to the tendency of healthy people to systematically underestimate the 
likelihood that they will experience future misfortune, including  
illness (Weinstein, 1989). This phenomenon was originally reported by Weinstein, 
who observed that participants estimated their own chances of experiencing negative 
events, such as contracting lung cancer or developing a drinking problem, as lower 
than the chances of their peers (Weinstein, 1980). It is thought that this “illusion of 
invulnerability” derives mainly from the need to protect self-esteem and to cope with 
the fear of being harmed (Weinstein, 1989). Typically investigated in a social-
psychological framework, we here postulate for the first time an association between 
this downplaying of threats to one’s own health and the well-known clinical 
phenomenon of anosognosia, which involves denial or unawareness of manifest 
illness or impairment, spectacularly evidenced by some patients with predominantly 
RH temporo-parietal-insular lesions (Orfei et al., 2007). We specifically propose to 
conceptualize UO regarding future health as "prospective anosognosia", i.e. the non-
pathological denial of health risks.  
Left-ear CI with iced water is a potent means of stimulating the vestibular system. 
Beyond its contribution to orientation and physical balance, this system is also 
involved in maintaining one’s emotional equilibrium (Ried & Aviles, 2007). In 
connection with the affective and cognitive evaluation of one’s own health state, CI 
has been shown to temporarily alleviate anosognosic denial of left-sided paralysis 
(Cappa et al., 1987), to influence mood and to reduce manic symptoms (Dodson, 
2004), presumably by boosting RH cortical networks subserving self-monitoring and 
insight. We therefore hypothesized that the same mechanism would transiently 
reduce UO about health risks in healthy individuals.  
 
Method 
 
Thirty-one healthy right-handed subjects (15 men, 20-40y) participated in this study. 
Prior to CI, each subject underwent an otological examination to ensure an intact 
tympanic membrane and, if necessary, to clear the external auditory canal. Subjects 
 44
2.1 Nosognosia and unrealistic optimism - Study 1 
were then oriented in supine position with the head inclined 30° from the horizontal 
and cold water (24°C) was irrigated into the external auditory canal first of one, then 
of the other ear (Fitzgerald & Hallpike, 1942). Eye movement recordings with video-
oculography verified successful vestibular stimulation. 30 seconds after CI of each 
ear was initiated, participants were asked to estimate their own risk, relative to that 
of their peers (same age, sex and education), of contracting a series of illnesses. Thirty 
illnesses (Table 4) were selected from a larger pool and pre-rated for the present 
study by a group of 30 independent healthy participants. To adapt our stimuli to the 
within-subjects design, we used three different lists of illnesses (one per condition) 
carefully matched with respect to harmfulness (F(2,27) =.05, p=.951), word length 
(F(2,27) = .17, p = .845), frequency (F(2,27) = .08, p = .923), avoidability (F(2,27) = .61, 
p = .551), and own experience and exposure (F(2,27) = .06, p = .942). The average 
level of UO per condition (baseline with no CI, left-ear CI and right-ear CI; order 
counterbalanced) was calculated for each participant.  
CI continued throughout the risk-estimation period. The risk rating scale ranged 
from -6 (lower risk) to +6 (higher risk). Each participant was tested in three 
conditions, with 5 minutes rest between each: baseline with no CI (always first), left-
ear CI and right-ear CI (order counterbalanced). Average UO per condition (mean of 
10 ratings) was calculated for each participant. 
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Table 4: List of illnesses read to the subjects (English translation in parentheses) 
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
 Pest 
 (pest) 
 Krebs 
 (cancer) 
 AIDS 
 (AIDS) 
 Lepra 
 (leprosy) 
 Pocken 
 (smallpox) 
 Grippe 
 (flue) 
 Rheuma 
 (rheumatism) 
 Anthrax 
 (anthrax) 
 Thyphus 
 (typhus) 
 Angina 
 (angina) 
 Migräne 
 (migraine) 
 Syphilis 
 (syphilis) 
 Malaria 
 (malaria) 
 Epilepsie 
 (epilepsy) 
 Hirntumor 
 (brain tumor) 
 Diabetes 
 (diabetes) 
 Rinderwahn 
 (mad cow disease) 
 Gelbsucht 
 (jaundice) 
 Depression 
 (depression) 
 Tuberkulose 
 (tuberculosis) 
 Arthritis 
 (arthritis) 
 Herzinfarkt 
 (heart attack) 
 Nierenleiden 
 (renal disease) 
 Schizophrenie 
 (schizophrenia) 
 Lungenentzündung 
 (pneumonia) 
 Magengeschwür 
 (stomach ulcer) 
 Multiple Sklerose 
 (multiple sclerosis) 
 Blinddarmentzündung 
 (appendicitis) 
 Hirnhautentzündung 
 (meningitis) 
 Mittelohrentzündung 
 (acute ear infection) 
 
 
Table 5: Experimental design of study 1 
Mean of 10 ratings per 
condition was 
calculated for each 
 Average 
UO 
Dependent 
variables 
 Baseline 
Left 
Right 
Caloric 
irrigation 
Independent 
variables 
Operationalization Levels Variables   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
 
A two-way mixed-design ANOVA, with gender as between-subjects variable and 
condition (baseline, left, right) as within-subjects variable, revealed a significant main 
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effect of condition on the magnitude of average UO (F(30)=3.5, p=0.036). Compared 
to baseline, average UO was significantly lower during left-ear CI (t(30)=3.0; p=.016), 
whereas it remained unchanged during right-ear CI (t(30)=1.44., p=.476) (Fig. 4a). 
Subjects’ UO was thus reduced selectively after left-ear stimulation.  
 
Figure 4: (a) Right-ear cold-water (24°C) CI in one typical subject. Note the similar strength of 
nystagmus, quantified by the eye movement velocity during the nystagmic slow-phase, for right- 
(60°/s) and left-ear (55°/s) CI (lower panel). Over all subjects, nystagmus during right-ear CI (mean  
SEM: 28.7°/s  2.5) was not significantly different from that during left-ear CI (27.6°/s  2.8; paired t-
test: p=0.56). UO assessment started after 30 seconds of CI. Nystagmus was present throughout the 
risk-estimation period. (b) Magnitude of average UO under left-ear CI, baseline and right-ear CI. 
Compared to baseline (mean  SEM: -1.62  0.23), UO was reduced under left-ear cold-water CI (-1.22 
 0.28). No comparable effect was found during right-ear CI (-1.42  0.26). 
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Discussion 
 
Cold-water CI of the ears predominantly activates brain areas in the contralateral 
hemisphere, in particular the parieto-insular cortex, which is considered the ‘core 
region’ of the multisensory vestibular cortex (Guldin & Grusser, 1998). In the RH, 
these regions also play a crucial role in self-awareness and their impairment may 
lead to anosognosia (Craig, 2009; Orfei et al., 2007). The finding that left-ear CI 
reduces UO in healthy subjects, possibly through activation of the right cerebral 
hemisphere, corroborates a neural basis of UO (Sharot et al., 2007) and supports our 
hypothesis that a qualitatively similar neuropsychological process underpins 
anosognosia and healthy optimism. Notably, this reduction is already present with a 
moderate vestibular stimulation (24° C). Presumably iced water would have 
produced a larger effect. However, since ice-water irrigation causes nausea in many 
subjects, we opted for the weaker stimulus. We speculate that the absence of an 
increase in UO during right-ear CI is linked to the larger vestibular responsivity of 
the RH (Bottini et al., 1994; Dieterich et al., 2003) and the reportedly strong ipsilateral 
activation after cold water irrigation of the right ear (Suzuki et al., 2001). 
The conceptualization of a person’s underestimation of future health risks as 
“prospective anosognosia” may open up new research avenues bridging the gap 
between neurology and psychology. It enables the investigation of nosognosia as a 
continuum function, ranging from the “hypernosognosia” of conversion disorders, 
through the unrealistic pessimism of the hypochondriac (Barsky et al., 2001), to 
healthy optimism and its pathological exaggeration in the overt denial of illness. Our 
findings highlight the asymmetric involvement of the left and right hemispheres in 
emotion regulation and realistic self-evaluation. They identify the RH parieto-insular 
cortex as a core region for the evaluation of one’s well-being and the anticipatory 
awareness of one’s future state (Craig, 2009). The human capacity to perceive the 
present and to project one’s self into the future may rely on a delicate functional 
balance between the two cerebral hemispheres. 
2.2 Interaction between emotion and space - Study 2 
2.2 Interaction between emotion and space 
2.2.1 Study 2: Emotion and space: lateralized emotional word detection depends on 
line bisection bias   
Tamagni, C., Mantei, T; Brugger, P. (Neuroscience, 2009) 
 
Abstract 
 
There is converging evidence, from various independent areas of neuroscience, for a 
functional specialization of the left and right cerebral hemispheres for positive and 
negative emotions, respectively ("valence theory" of emotional processing). One 
subfield, however, has produced mixed results, i.e. work on the detection of 
parafoveally presented positively or negatively emotional words by healthy subjects. 
RVF or LVF advantages were described and interpreted as reflecting the superiority 
of either the LH for linguistic material, or of the RH for highly emotional stimuli. 
Here we show that 48 healthy, right-handed participants' performance on a 
lateralized lexical decision task depends on their individual inclination to bisect a 
line to the left or right of the objective center. Only those with a bisection bias to the 
right showed the LH advantage for word detection known from the 
neuropsychological literature. Negative emotional words were processed with 
comparable accuracy in the two visual fields. However, a recognition advantage for 
negative over positive emotional words was found exclusively for those participants 
with a leftward line bisection bias. These results suggest that in work on functional 
hemispheric differences state variables like stimulus lateralization and word 
emotionality may be less decisive than the trait variable of lateral hemispatial 
attention. We propose a cautious reconsideration of the concept of "hemisphericity", 
which once emphasized individual differences in baseline hemispheric arousal, but 
was later dismissed in a reaction to oversimplifications in popular science accounts. 
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Introduction 
 
An influential theory of emotion processing suggests that approach-related, positive 
emotions are primarily processed by anterior regions of the LH, while corresponding 
areas of the RH preferentially deal with threatening, withdrawal-related stimuli 
(Davidson & Sutton, 1995; Kinsbourne, 1978). Support for this "valence theory" of 
emotional hemispheric processing comes from at least four largely independent areas 
of research. 
 
First, anthropological sources have long pointed out an association, culturally largely 
invariant, between "right" and "correct", "good" and "favorable" and between "left" 
and "depraved", "sinister" or "gauche", respectively (Hertz, 1909). This association is 
not likely to be due to peripheral factors like manual dexterity and skill, but rather 
reflects a more general tendency to expect safety in the right hemispace and danger 
on one's left (Fabbro, 1994; Tan, 1998). Whether these expectations are based directly 
on (unilateral) neural networks common to the analysis of both space and emotions 
or whether they reflect more abstract congruency effects in the frame of a 
metaphorical representation of affect (Crawford et al., 2006; Meier & Robinson, 2005) 
is currently a matter of debate. 
 
A second line of evidence in favour of a valence-dependent hemispheric processing 
of emotions derives from clinical investigations of patients with unilateral brain 
damage. As a rule, damage to (anterior) regions of the LH induces negative affect, 
depression or even elicits "catastrophic reactions", while comparable damage to the 
RH may rather lead to enhanced positive mood, anosodiaphoria (i.e., marked 
downplaying of the consequences of an illness) and mania-like, euphoric reactions 
(Davidson & Sutton, 1995; Gainotti, 1972; Silberman & Weingartner, 1986). Also, 
unilateral hallucinations after brain damage are experienced as emotionally negative 
when occurring in the LVF, while those in the RVF are of predominantly positive 
content (Walters et al., 2006). Even in not strictly lateralized psychiatric disorders, the 
degree of negativity of hallucinatory experiences correlates with specifically RH 
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involvement, both in the auditory-verbal (Sommer et al., 2008) and somesthetic 
domain (Brugger, 2007). 
 
Third, the perhaps strongest support for a biological foundation of the association 
between lateral space and emotional valence derives from research in animals. 
Primate studies revealed a larger RH than LH arousal by the view of specifically 
aggressive acts (Parr & Hopkins, 2000) and, on the output side, more aggressive 
displays to enemies approaching from the left hemispace (Casperd & Dunbar, 1996). 
Horses' sensitivity to threat is larger when the aversive stimulus is presented on the 
left than on the right side (Austin & Rogers, 2007), and tail-wagging in dogs is 
modulated by the affective valence of the eliciting cue: right-biased for familiar 
stimuli such as the dog's owner and left-biased for threatening stimuli such as an 
unknown conspecific (Quaranta et al., 2007). Even in reptilians and amphibia, lateral 
space seems to be associated with opposite emotive connotations; in toads, tongue 
protrusions are more frequently directed to the right during predatory behavior, but 
to the left when they signal agonistic acts (Vallortigara et al., 1998). In lizards, the 
finding that specifically aggressive behavior is under left eye/RH guidance made 
(Deckel, 1995) p. 194 conclude: "...these results suggest that the lizard Anolis, like 
humans, rats, and chicks, may mediate aggressive responses predominantly through 
right-hemispheric mechanisms".  
 
Finally, divided visual field studies in healthy subjects revealed a RH superiority in 
the recognition of negative facial expressions and a similar superiority of the LH for 
happy expressions (Reuter-Lorenz & Davidson, 1981). In contrast, lateralized 
tachistoscopic experiments with verbal stimuli have produced mixed support for the 
valence theory of emotional hemispheric processing (see the review by (Habib, 1998) 
In some studies, emotional words were better recognized in the LVF/RH, 
irrespective of valence (Graves et al., 1981). Other authors have found a perceptual 
identification advantage for the RVF, reflecting the dominance of the LH for 
linguistic processing (Nagae & Moscovitch, 2002). Because of these inconsistencies, 
valence theories are usually discussed as only one of several alternatives in the 
 51
2.2 Interaction between emotion and space - Study 2 
conceptual analysis of hemispheric differences in emotional processing (see Demaree 
et al., 2005), for a comprehensive overview).  
 
To our knowledge, in none of the previous experiments on the lateralized 
tachistoscopic detection of highly emotional words performances were ever analyzed 
as a function of a subject's baseline asymmetry in hemispatial attention. In line 
bisection tasks, for instance, lateral deviations of the subjective midpoint to either the 
left or right side are a robust indicator of hemispheric involvement also in non-
spatial cognition (Mohr et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2002). With special reference to 
emotional processing, Drake & Ulrich (1992) found right-handed subjects, who 
showed a rightward displacement in line bisection (reflecting a LH mediated 
orienting response), more optimistic than those showing a displacement to the 
opposite side of the lines' objective midpoint. The purpose of the present experiment 
was to measure detection performance for highly emotional words not only as a 
function of the visual field / hemisphere of presentation (a state variable), but also as 
a function of an individual's hemispatial line bisection bias as a trait.  
 
Experimental procedures 
 
Forty-eight healthy university students (24 women) gave written informed consent to 
participate in the experiment. Testing was undertaken in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki and the local Ethics Committee had approved the study. 
Participants' mean age was 24.5 years (SD=1.3 yrs.), all were neurologically and 
psychiatrically healthy according to an extended neuropsychiatric history interview, 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were strongly right-handed (Chapman 
& Chapman, 1987). 
The word detection task consisted of 64 trials. In each trial, a letter string (3 to 7 
letters) was flashed for 116 msec either to the left or to the right of a central fixation 
cross, which had to be fixated by subjects for the entire task (stimulus excentricity 
was 2 to 4 degrees of visual angle horizontally). In 32 trials, the letter string was a 
pronounceable nonsense word (no response required), in 32 trials it was either a 
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positively (16 trials) or negatively emotional word (keyboard response "as fast as 
possible" with a response key ipsilateral to the flashed word; instructions did not 
mention word emotionality as a critical factor). Stimulus words were taken from a 
list of words previously rated as unambiguously eliciting highly positive or highly 
negative emotions by a large independent student group (Gianotti et al., 2008). The 
full list of stimulus words can be found below. Each emotional word was once 
presented in the RVF and once in the LVF, the sequence of visual field stimulation 
was pseudorandomized. Stimulus presentation and response collection was 
programmed with the software MacProbe (Hunt, 1994). 
The line bisection task required subjects to mark the midpoint of each of 12 lines (line 
lengths 13-24.5 cm) with a sharp pencil held in the dominant right hand. 
Displacements of the subjective from the objective midpoint were measured to the 
nearest mm for each line, and the average displacement over all 12 lines was 
calculated for each participant. Based on the direction of the mean displacement (left 
or right of objective midpoint), a subject was ascribed to one of two bisection groups 
(“left bisectors” or “right bisectors”). 
We planned to perform an ANOVA of the number of correct word detections with 
two between-subject factors (gender and bisection group) and visual 
field/hemisphere and valence of word emotionality as repeated measures. We also 
planned to correlate individual displacements in the bisection task with the number 
of correctly detected words (positive and negative) in each visual field. Emphasis 
was not on the absolute error in bisection, but on its direction (i.e. leftward vs. 
rightward bisections).  
 
Target stimuli of the word detection task were following: 
Positively emotional words: GLÜCK (happiness); HERZ (heart); KUSS (kiss); LEBEN 
(life); LIEBE (love); LUST (zest, lust); SPASS (fun); WONNE (delight) 
Negatively emotional words: ANGST (fear); GIFT (poison); GRAB (grave); HASS 
(hatred); MORD (murder); PANIK (panic); SARG (coffin); TOD (death) 
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Table 6: Experimental design of study 2  
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Visual field 
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Independent 
variables 
Operationalization Levels Variables   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
 
Twenty-nine subjects (13 women) were left bisectors, 18 right bisectors. The average 
bisection performance of one participant (a woman) was exactly at the objective 
midpoint, and her word detection performance was not analyzed. 
The planned ANOVA of correct word detections revealed main effects of visual field 
(F = 11.5, p < .002) and valence (F = 17.0, p < .0005); words in the RVF/LH were 
better detected than in the LVF/RH and negative words were better recognized than 
positive words. There were no main effects of gender (F =.44, p>.51) and bisection 
group (F = .038, p>.84), but significant interactions between bisection group and 
visual field (F = 4.9, p < .04) and valence (F = 9.1, p<.005). Participants of the right 
bisection group had a strong RVF/LH superiority for correct word detections (paired 
t-test, t=3.3, p<.005, two-tailed; see Figure 5) while there was no visual 
field/hemisphere superiority for the participants of the left bisection group (t=1.1, 
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p=.30; Figure 5). Only left bisectors detected more negatively than positively 
valenced words (paired t-test, t=5.2, p<.0001, two-tailed; see Figure 6); there was no 
comparable difference for right bisectors (t=1.1, p=.30, two-tailed; Figure 6). Gender 
did not interact with any of the other factors (all F-values ≤ 2.3, corresponding p-
values >.13). Individual deviations in the bisection task (mean over 12 lines) 
correlated positively with the number of correctly recognized positive emotional 
words in the RVF/LH (r=.30, p<.05, two-tailed; the more rightward the 
displacement, the better the detection), but tendentially negatively with the number 
of negative emotional words in the LVF/RH (r=-.23, p=.12, two-tailed; the more 
rightward the displacement, the poorer the detection). Both these correlations were 
clearly significant for the 24 men (r=.52, p<.01, two-tailed and r=-.44, p<.05, two-
tailed), but not for the women (both r-values <.16).  
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Mean number of 
words detected  
 
 8
6
6.5
7
7.5
* n.s.  
 
 
 RVF/ 
LH 
RVF/ 
LH 
LVF/ 
RH 
LVF/ 
RH  
 
Right bisection Left bisection  
group (n=18) group (n=29) 
Figure 5: Mean correct word detections irrespective of emotional valence (max. possible = 8.0 per 
visual field). Data are displayed for two participant groups separately, according to their inclination 
to bisect lines to the left or right of the true center. A RVF/  LH superiority is only evident for 
participants with a rightward bisection bias. Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
 
Mean number of 
words detected  
 
 
6 
6.5 
7 
7.5 
8 positive 
negative *n.s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Mean correct word detections (max. possible = 8.0) as a function of emotional valence. 
Data are displayed for two participant groups separately, according to their inclination to bisect lines 
to the left or right of the true center. A recognition advantage for negatively emotional words is only 
evident for participants with a leftward bisection bias. Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
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Discussion 
 
We assessed healthy right-handed subjects' detection accuracy for highly emotional 
words presented in the RVF or LVF, that is, projecting primarily to the LH or RH, 
respectively. Half of the words elicited positive emotions (e.g., KISS), the other half 
negative emotions (e.g., MURDER). In the past, similar experiments with nonverbal 
stimuli (e.g. photographs of faces or scenes) had revealed an interaction between 
visual field of presentation and emotional valence, specifically a better performance 
of the LH for positive and a better performance of the RH for negative emotions 
(Reuter-Lorenz & Davidson, 1981). However, lexical decision experiments have often 
failed to find such an interaction between the valence of a stimulus word and the 
processing hemisphere (Graves et al., 1981; Nagae & Moscovitch, 2002). Based on 
known effects of an individual's hemispatial bias on cognitive processing (Mohr et 
al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2002) and emotional attitudes (Drake & Ulrich, 1992), we 
assessed our subjects' inclination to bisect a line to the left or right of its veridical 
midpoint. We ascribed a participant to a right or a left bisection group depending on 
whether his or her bisection mark (averaged over 12 trials) deviated to either side. 
The fact that the majority of our subjects deviated to the left is in accordance with a 
vast literature on "pseudoneglect", i.e. the predominant tendency towards systematic 
leftward shifts of spatial attention both in healthy humans (Jewell & McCourt, 2000) 
and animals (Diekamp et al., 2005). The magnitude of pseudoneglect is thought to be 
a function of the extent to which an individual relies on RH cognitive functions, both 
spatial and non-spatial (Taylor et al., 2002). In fact, as a group, our left bisecting 
subjects did not show the LH superiority for lexical decisions regularly described for 
right-handed subjects in the neuropsychological literature. This lack of dominance 
was due to both a numerically diminished RVF/LH performance, and a similarly 
enhanced detection accuracy for the LVF/RH (Figure 5), lending support to the model 
of interhemispheric cooperation based on a mechanism of mutual inhibition and 
release (Regard et al., 1994). With respect to the emotional valence of the stimulus 
words, a line bisection bias towards the left was accompanied by a significantly 
better detection accuracy for negative compared to positive words; no comparable 
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asymmetry was observed in the subjects of the right-bisection group. This LVF 
advantage evidenced by the left bisectors is in accordance with previous lesion 
studies, which emphasized the RH's prominent role in the experience of specifically 
negative emotions. Such a role was inferred from the observation that patients with 
right-sided cortical damage were more likely to show an elevated, positive mood and 
a neglect, not only of the left half of space, but also of the severity of their symptoms 
(Davidson & Sutton, 1995). However, single-system models like the valence theory of 
hemispheric processing or one of its major rival concepts, the general RH superiority 
for all emotional experience, have received but limited support from neuroimaging 
studies (Murphy et al., 2003). These have rather implicated complex interaction 
between cortical (anterior and posterior) and subcortical structures in the mediation 
of both the perception and the production of emotions. We suggest that future 
neuroimaging experiments could profit from the findings in the present experiment. 
An assessment of individual subjects' baseline lateral activation asymmetries in 
anterior cortical circuits could enable researchers to avoid the often bewildering 
multiplicity of activation areas in response to even rather focal task demands. Paying 
attention to the issue of individual differences could help to reduce the variance 
across participants and lead to entirely new insights into the functional 
neuroanatomy of emotion. 
 
In previous decades, individual differences in baseline hemispheric activation states 
were captured by the concept of "hemisphericity" (Bogen et al., 1972). Unfortunately, 
this concept of hemispheric balance as a trait became soon a victim of the then rapid 
popularization of research in functional hemispheric specialization. It deteriorated to 
pop-psychological accounts of "left brain types" and "right brain types". As a 
consequence, the notion of hemisphericity was discredited in the scientific literature 
(Beaumont et al., 1984). We suggest that this reaction of academic neuropsychologists 
was unwarranted and may have prevented consideration of individual differences in 
baseline hemispheric arousal. Specifically, it is conceivable that previous failures to 
substantiate the valence theory of emotional processing in experimental paradigms 
involving lateralized lexical decisions may have been due to a unilateral emphasis on 
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the visual field of word presentation. Our results show that this state-variable of 
hemifield-hemisphere association may be less decisive than a person's inclination, as 
a trait, to process space and unilaterally presented stimuli with a relative preference 
for using one hemisphere more than the other. This notion is in accordance with 
earlier observations that baseline arousal differences between the hemispheres 
predicted subjects' performances in a wide variety of lateralized perceptual decision 
tasks (Kim & Levine, 1992; Levy et al., 1983; Spencer & Banich, 2005). 
On a more general level, our finding of an interaction between emotion and space 
adds to a growing literature on tight relationships between affective states and 
indicators of spatial position. Phrases like "a close friend" or "distant acquaintances" 
are sayings, whose emotional connotations can be traced to the processing of near 
and far space. Positively valued words are reportedly faster recognized when their 
presentation on a screen induces the illusion of an approaching movement, while 
words depicting negative emotions are better detected when they seem to move 
away from oneself (Neumann & Strack, 2000). Also in the horizontal dimension, 
motion and emotion can intimately influence each other. For instance, the error of 
pointing to the location where a moving stimulus has just vanished (in the direction 
of movement, "representational momentum") is exaggerated by an emotionally 
attractive relationship between the moving object and a laterally presented flanker 
(e.g. a mouse and a cheese). On the other hand, a threatening flanker (a cat, in the 
case of a moving mouse) diminishes the error by counteracting the past-pointing 
(Daum & Frick, 2004). Future research should elucidate left/right asymmetries in 
such instances of embodied cognition and try to disentangle metaphorical (i.e. 
linguistically mediated) components of spatial-emotional congruency effects from 
more hard-wired, biologically founded links between emotion and space. 
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2.2.2 Study 3: Contemplating negative events shifts attention to the left  
Tamagni, C., Croce, S., Wettstein, V., Brugger, P. (Submitted to CABN, 2010) 
 
Abstract 
 
We provide a review of studies investigating the interactions between emotional 
processing and spatial attention (along the horizontal, radial and vertical axis).  
We also introduce an experiment, which required adults and children to bisect 
horizontal and radial lines while contemplating positive or negative events. 
Imagining negative events enhanced leftward deviation in both groups, with an 
overall larger bisection error in children. No difference in positive and negative 
emotion conditions emerged for radial bisections. The findings in the horizontal 
dimension are consistent with the previous literature and corroborate the 
predominant role of the RH in mediating negative affect. The failure to modulate the 
attentional bias along the radial axis is interpreted as pointing to a more 
metaphorical representation of affect in connection with the concepts “near” and 
“far”. 
 
Introduction 
 
Links between emotion and space abound in our daily lives, even if we may rarely 
get aware of them at a conscious level. In language, they hide in words with a 
double-meaning, one designating a spatial direction or extension, the other having an 
affective connotation (right, great). They also lure in a wide range of common 
metaphors, which for instance represent affective involvement in terms of distance (a 
close friend, a distant relative) or affective valence in terms of verticality (thumbs 
up/down; sinking into depression; showing elevated mood). A rapidly growing body of 
empirical data shows that these space-affect associations do not simply reflect 
superficial linguistic conventions, but play a central role in the organization of 
thought (Barsalou, 2008; Crawford et al., 2006).  
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Tables 7-9 provide a selective overview on studies documenting the tight interplay 
between emotional processing and spatial orientation along, respectively, the three 
cardinal axes left/right, near/far and up/down.  
 
Affect and attention along the lateral horizontal extension (Tab. 7) 
The left/right dimension is probably the one most intimately linked to emotional 
processing. This may be the consequence of a hardwired specialization of each 
cerebral hemisphere for dealing with information incoming from the contralateral 
hemispace, which coincides with a similar specialization for stimuli that have a 
positive or negative emotional valence. This laterality aspect of emotion and space 
appears to be deeply engraved into bilaterally symmetric nervous systems. Thus, the 
idea that positive affect is associated with the right side of space and negative affect 
with the left hemispace abounds in studies on animal laterality (MacNeilage et al., 
2009). Across a vast range of species, threatening information appears more salient, 
when detected on the left of the animal’s body and approach-signalling behavior is 
rather directed to the right side. In human neuropsychology, “valence theories” of 
emotional hemispheric processing (Demaree et al., 2005; Kinsbourne, 1978) describe 
an association between positive affect and the LH and an association between 
negative affect and the RH. Much of the evidence for these opposite emotional 
hemispheric preferences comes from clinical observations in patients with unilateral 
brain lesions. Thus, depression often follows (anterior) damage to LH cortical 
structures, whereas mania or inappropriately elevated mood is more frequent after 
right-sided lesions (Gainotti, 1972). Work with healthy subjects complements these 
inferences from patient observation. Thus, divided visual field experiments revealed 
a recognition superiority of the LH for happy facial expression and a similar 
advantage of the RH for sad expressions (Davidson & Sutton, 1995; Reuter-Lorenz & 
Davidson, 1981). Likewise, in a study on lateral hemispatial asymmetries as a trait, 
right-handed subjects with a marked left-sided displacement in line bisection 
(“pseudoneglect”) showed a recognition advantage for negative over positive 
emotional words (Tamagni et al., 2009).  
In Table 7 we list studies which have investigated interactions between healthy 
subjects’ hemispatial bias and their affective state or the emotional valence of a 
 62
2.2 Interaction between emotion and space - Study 3 
stimulus. Not included are lateralized tachistoscopic or dichotic experiments as 
typically designed to test classical valence theories of emotional hemispheric 
processing. Otherwise, we have attempted to select a broad range of different 
experimental paradigms, without however, claiming to be exhaustive. Some of these 
paradigms aimed at biasing the emotional evaluation of neutral stimuli by 
asymmetric spatial orientation. Drake (1987), for instance, long before the term 
“embodied cognition” was fashionable, had participants turn their body to one side 
of space and indicate how much they liked or disliked photographs of outdoor 
scenes taken from a magazine (Tab. 7). He found that male subjects liked right-sided 
pictures better than left-sided, and ascribed the absence of a similarly significant 
effect in the female subjects to insufficient statistical power. More recently, one 
would have accounted for this gender effect in terms of gender differences in 
hemispheric cooperation (Cahill, 2006). Other experimenters used sensory 
stimulation of one side of the body to bias aesthetic judgments or emotionality 
ratings. Bassel & Schiff (2001), for instance, found that subjects, who had received 
right-sided vibrotactile stimulation to the forearm during approx. half an hour, made 
more positive judgments of an emotionally neutral film than those after left-sided 
stimulation (Tab. 7). Similar results were obtained after unilateral motor action, such 
as the contraction of the hand (Schiff & Truchon, 1993) or facial muscles (Schiff & 
Lamon, 1994).  
Root and colleagues (2006) asked participants to identify the emotion of target faces 
responding with either the left or the right hand. Right-hand responses were faster 
for happy faces, whereas left-hand responses were faster for angry faces, a result 
which supports the view that response preparation to positive stimuli is left-
lateralized.  
A unique approach was described by Wapner and colleagues (1956), who studied the 
effect of danger to participants’ left or right side on lateral shifts of spatial attention 
(Tab. 7). As they were not interested in left/right differences, they did not discuss the 
laterality finding that emerged from their manipulation. Only those subjects standing 
on the left edge of a table, thus having the threatening stimulus of a “precipice” to 
their left, showed a right-sided attentional shift in their subjective straight ahead. 
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More modern authors, applying comparable paradigms of unilaterally applied threat 
stimuli in animal research (e.g., Austin & Rogers, 2007) would have interpreted this 
finding as a superiority of the RH in detecting danger. We note, however, that such 
an interpretation is at variance with the finding of an enhanced right-sided spatial 
attention, in the study by Wapner et al., as a consequence of the presumably larger 
RH activation. 
The bisection of horizontally presented lines is another paradigm used in studies on 
emotional-spatial interactions. Used primarily as a clinical tool to quantify motor and 
attentional biases in brain damaged patients, line bisection can be exploited to 
monitor a surprising number of cognitive operations (Fischer, 2001). A pioneer 
application in the domain of emotional processing is the study by Drake and Ulrich, 
1992 (Exp. 2; see Tab. 7). These authors assessed participants’ “personal optimism”, 
i.e. their tendency to overestimate the likelihood of positive events (e.g., getting a 
higher salary) and to underestimate the likelihood of negative events (e.g., getting 
divorced). Event probabilities had to be estimated for one’s own future life and in 
comparison to the probabilities assumed for a typical peer (same sex, age, 
socioeconomic background, etc.). Optimism scores were positively correlated to 
right-deviations in a line bisection task, a finding interpreted as favoring the view of 
a LH dominance for supporting a positive emotional attitude. Also Drago et al. 
(2008) had their subjects bisect lines after the judgment of emotional valence of a 
series of paintings (Tab. 7). They used participants’ accuracy of horizontal line 
bisection performance, irrespective of the lateral deviation of the errors, to predict 
differences in emotion evocation. Findings indicated that people, who display a 
greater accuracy in the line bisection task (i.e. greater ability to allocate attention) 
judge the evocative impact of paintings to be greater, suggesting that line bisection 
performance reflect that interindividual differences in emotional processing. The 
results also showed that right temporo-parietal regions are critical for both spatial 
attention and emotional processing.  
A novel method was employed by Foster et al. (2008), who studied attentional 
allocation along two dimensions at once, i.e. in the lateral horizontal and in the radial 
extension (see Tab. 7 and Tab. 8). They required participants to distribute pegs 
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marked with an emotional label on a large board “in any position of their chosing”. 
Labels were “happy”, “joyful”, “surprised”, “afraid”, “sad”, and “disgusted”. Only 
the first three of them, i.e. the positively labelled pegs, were placed with a significant 
lateral and radial bias. Contrary to predictions from classical valence theories of 
emotional hemispheric processing, there was a left-sided preference for the positive 
emotions. This finding was interpreted by the authors as a release of posterior right 
hemispheric functions as a consequence of a left posterior inhibition, the latter itself a 
result of emotion-induced left anterior activation. Apart from this experiment, the 
ambiguous finding by Wapner et al. (1956) and the null results by Crawford et al. 
(2006), the studies listed in Table 7 provide support for the contention of an 
association of positive affect with the right side of space and a left-sided spatial bias 
for negative affect. 
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Table 7: Synopsis of 9 experiments on interactions between healthy human subjects' emotional 
processing and attention along the left/right axis 
Reference (chronological order) Task(s) Major finding(s) 
   
Wapner et al., 1956 (Exp. 1) To move a luminant rectangle laterally 
until it appears straight-ahead under 
conditions of induced danger (standing at 
the edge of a table in darkness) 
  
Right-shift of subjective straight ahead 
when precipice on the left, but no 
comparable shift to either side when 
dangerous stimulus to the right 
 
Drake, 1987 To turn one's body/head/eyes 90° 
laterally in order to judge the likeability 
of photographs  
More positive evaluations of right-sided 
photographs for the 30 men, but not for the 
30 women  
 
Drake and Ulrich, 1992 
(Exp. 2) 
To bisect horizontal lines. To indicate 
one's personal optimism about future life 
events 
More optimistic subjects show larger 
rightward bias 
 
Schiff & Truchon, 1993 To judge whether the facial expression of 
chimeric and neutral faces was more 
positive or negative. During the task, the 
experimenter contract unilateral hand 
muscles of the participant to explore the 
effect of the right vs left stimulation on 
emotional judgments 
    
Judgments of chimeric faces (half sad, half 
happy) show a negative bias when the left 
face was negative. This bias is reduced by 
contractions of the right hand, whereas left 
hand contractions had no effect.   
Bassel & Schiff, 2001 To judge an emotionally neutral film 
after unlateral vibrotactile stimulation of 
one forearm  
More positive judgments after right-sided 
stimulation, no affects after left-sided 
stimulation 
  
Crawford et al., 2006 
(Expts. 1 to 3) 
 
 
To watch affectively evocative pictures 
(positive or negative valence) at variable 
vertical locations on a screen and to later 
recall the position of each picture, 
displayed again, but in the centre of the 
screen 
 
Remembered locations along the left/right 
axis were not influenced by the affect 
manipulation (but see Table 9, for 
significant effects in the vertical dimension) 
Root et. al, 2006  To respond with the left or with the right 
hand to identify the emotions of target 
faces  
Faster right-hand response for positive faces 
and left-hand response for negative faces 
Drago, 2008  To bisect horizontal lines and to judge 
the emotional evocation of paintings 
People who display greater accuracy in the 
line bisection task (who can better allocate 
attention) are more influenced by the 
emotional messages of the paintings. This 
result indicates the dominant role of the 
right hemisphere (temporo-parietal regions) 
for both spatial attention and emotion 
 
Foster et al., 2008 To place pegs carrying verbal emotional 
labels on a large board 
Positively labelled pegs placed to the left of 
negatively labelled pegs (for effects in the 
proximal/distal dimension see Table 8) 
 
   
 
 
 66
2.2 Interaction between emotion and space - Study 3 
In more recent times, the simple dichotomy “left hemispace – negative emotions” 
versus “right hemispace – positive emotions” has been revised (Demaree et al., 2005). 
It has been replaced by the “motivational-direction model” of emotional hemispheric 
processing (Harmon-Jones, 2004). This model suggests a LH / right hemispace 
dominance for approach-related emotions (including anger, a rather negative 
emotion; van Honk & Schutter, 2006) and a corresponding dominance of the RH for 
withdrawal-related emotions. This dimension, although most relevant to the lateral-
horizontal axis, leads us to a discussion of the near space / far space distinction along 
the radial expansion of the space around us. 
 
Affect and attention along the radial axis (Tab. 8) 
In neuropsychology, a relevant distinction along the radial axis is the one between 
front space and back space (Viaud-Delmon et al., 2007). While the differences 
between these two spaces are evident, both phenomenally and from an action-
perception point of view, there is a less elaborate distinction between two different 
compartments within front space. Attention in “near” and “far” space is differently 
coded by the brain; the clearest clinical evidence originating perhaps from the field of 
hemispatial neglect. This disorder can be double dissociated, i.e. there are patients 
showing neglect in near, but not far space (Halligan & Marshall, 1991), and other 
patients, whose signs of neglect are confined to far space (Vuilleumier et al., 1998). 
The functional neuroanatomy underlying this distinction is arguably a LH/near 
space and RH/far space processing specialization (Weiss et al., 2000). While these 
observations describe an interaction between processing deficits along the radial 
dimension and a variable relevant to the left/right dimension, i.e. a lesion typically 
in the RH, some work in healthy subjects suggests opposite hemispheric 
specialization for stimuli in near and far space. Specifically, it is assumed that the LH, 
because of its general motor dominance, directs attention preferably to near-
peripersonal, grasping space, while the RH is more specialized for the analysis of 
stimuli in visual-extrapersonal, far space (Heilman et al., 1995; Graff-Radford et al., 
2006; but see Bjoertomt et al., 2009 and Previc et al., 2005), for an alternative view. 
This near-space/LH and far-space/RH dichotomy is compatible with extended 
valence theories of emotional hemispheric processing, which postulate a LH 
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dominance for approach (mostly positive emotions) and a RH dominance for flight 
or withdrawal responses, typically elicited by negative emotional stimuli. However, 
investigations of the interactions between emotional processing in near vs. far space 
(Tab. 8) do not usually make reference to functional hemispheric differences. Two 
research paradigms dominate. One uses a motor response away respectively towards 
the participant’s body (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Markman & Dietrich, 2000). The findings 
are clear; there is a compatibility effect with faster responses for positive-emotional 
(negative-emotional) stimuli for the approach (avoidance) response mode. This 
compatibility is interpreted as reflecting a short-cut of the cognitive system to 
embodied meaning: negative stimuli are better kept at a distance, whereas what is 
positive and desirable is worth to be approached. However, closeness to one’s body 
is only one factor involved; if the location of the response keys in relation to the 
stimulus is made especially salient, emotional-spatial compatibilities may be 
observed in a stimulus-centered frame of reference (Markman & Brendl, 2005; Seibt 
et al., 2008; see Tab.8).  
Another paradigm requires subjects to respond to stimuli of differing affective 
valence with a flexion response (characteristic of making contact with an object) or 
with an extension response (rather activating an avoidance system). Stimuli, 
evaluated during maintenance of isometric arm extension or flexion are commonly 
judged later as more or less likeable (Cacioppo et al., 1993). Even the mere extension 
vs. flexion of one single finger to elicit the motor response can be effective to bias the 
advantage for positive or negative stimuli (Seibt et al., 2008; Tab. 8). To our 
knowledge, only one study has investigated interactions between flexion/extension 
movements and the approach/avoidance specialization of the two cerebral 
hemispheres. Maxwell & Davidson (2007) showed in a divided-visual field task with 
laterally exposed distally or proximally pointing arrows that the proximal bias for 
flexion and the distal bias for extension is asymmetrically organized across the two 
hemispheres (larger in the LH). Their experiment appears promising for future 
studies of spatial-emotional interactions in that it may help to reconcile hemispheric 
difference models with cognitive theories relying on an embodied meaning of 
approach and avoidance. 
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Other, more isolated research paradigms involve the estimation of the physical 
distance of positively or negatively valenced items (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010) or the 
priming of an emotionally evaluative response by presenting subjects with short or 
long physical distances (Williams & Bargh, 2008). Not readily compatible with the 
view of an action-based association between emotion and physical distance in the 
front plane are the results of Foster et al. (2008). These authors had subjects place 
pegs on an “emotional pegboard”. Pegs carried the labels of 6 basic emotions, and 
those positively labelled were placed farther away from one’s body (and, as 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, on the left side of the board). It is doubtful, 
however, whether a simple verbal label can induce a corresponding emotional state, 
and the authors proposed themselves that alternative measures of affect induction 
(e.g. the activation of emotional memories) should be tried out. Surprisingly, one 
methodology to reliably quantify spatial attention along a radial axis appears to be 
absent in the work on interactions between emotion and space. This is the simple 
task of radial line bisection that we have employed in the present study. 
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Table 8: Synopsis of 10 experiments on interactions between healthy human subjects' emotional 
processing and attention along the radial axis 
Reference (chronological order) Task(s) Major finding(s) 
   
Cacioppo et al., 1993 
(Exp. 1 and 2) 
To rate the pleasantness of Chinese 
ideographs presented during either arm 
flexion or arm extension 
Ideographs presented during flexion were 
rated more pleasant than ideographs 
presented under extension 
 
Chen & Bargh, 1999, Exp. 1 
 
To pull or push a lever to categorize 
visually presented words as good or bad 
(group one: pull for good, push for bad, 
group two: opposite action/valence 
assignment) 
Faster reaction times for pull responses to 
positively evaluated words and faster 
reaction times for push responses to 
negative words  
 
  
Chen & Bargh, 1999, Exp. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To pull or push a lever on detecting words 
visually presented at random time intervals. 
Words were positive or negative in 
meaning and response action (pulling, 
pushing) was blocked in a counterbalanced 
within-subjects design 
Faster reaction times for pull responses to 
positively evaluated words and faster 
reaction times for push responses to 
negative words  
 
 
Neumann & Strack, 2000 To categorize highly emotional adjectives 
presented on a computer screen as positive 
or negative during continuous arm flexion 
or arm extension 
 
Faster categorization of positive words 
during arm flexion and faster categorization 
of negative words during arm extension 
  
Markman & Brendl, 2005 To pull or push a lever to categorize 
positively or negatively valenced words 
presented on a computer screen, either 
distal or proximal to the subject's own name 
 
For positively evaluated words faster 
responses towards the location of the self 
(one's first name), for negatively evaluated 
words faster away-from-self responses 
  
Foster et al., 2008 To place pegs carrying verbal emotional 
labels on a large board 
Positively labelled pegs placed distally of 
negatively labelled pegs (for effects in the 
lateral-horizontal dimension see Table 7) 
  
Seibt et al., 2008 To use two response keys (or a joystick) to 
classify emotionally negative or positive 
words or pictures of old or young people. 
Keys (joystick position) close or distant to 
the stimulus 
 
Reaction time advantage for positive 
stimuli on the key closer to the stimulus. 
Body/self-centered vs. object-centered 
reference frames can be altered by 
instruction 
  
Williams & Bargh, 2008 
(Studies 1 to 4) 
To judge the pleasantness of an 
embarrassing story, one's mood after a 
violent story, to estimate the number of 
calories in unhealthy food and to rate the 
strength of bonds to family and friends after 
being primed with small or large physical 
distances 
 
Compared to priming with spatial 
closeness, priming with spatial distance 
leads to lessened emotional impact of 
negative stimuli and to decreased emotional 
attachment to family and friends 
  
Balcetis & Dunning, 2010 
(Studies 1 to 3) 
To rate the physical distance of 
physiologically or socially desirable 
objects; to throw a ball towards objects of 
varying emotional significance 
 
Shorter estimated distance for emotionally 
more attractive items, both by numerical 
ratings and ball throwing 
  
Drago et al., 2010 
 
To freely set a mark on an empty sheet of 
paper after the evocation of positive or 
negative emotional memories 
Positive emotional memories induce a 
distal bias and sad memories induce a 
proximal bias 
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Affect and attention along the vertical extension (Tab. 9) 
On first consideration, the association between positive emotions and upper space 
and that between negative emotions and lower space, although crossculturally 
surprisingly invariant (Yu, 1995), seems to be entirely symbolic. However, upper and 
lower visual fields are characterized by different functional specializations in the 
primate visual system (Previc, 1990), and various higher-order cognitive operations 
are reportedly drawing on these differences (Goldstein, 2001; Niebauer & Christman, 
1998; Previc et al., 2005; Previc & Intraub, 1997). Even abstract concepts such as 
religiosity incorporate dissociations in the meaning of up and down that may 
ultimately be grounded in basic properties of perception and action (Meier et al., 
2007; Previc et al., 2005). Table 9 lists 9 experiments on the interaction between 
emotional and spatial processing along the up-down axis. The paradigms used range 
from projecting one’s subjective horizon (Wapner et al., 1957; Fisher, 1964) to the 
evaluation or inspection of emotional stimuli exposed in the upper or lower half of 
the visual field (Crawford et al., 2006) and to forced body positions (upright vs. 
slumped; Wilson & Peper, 2004) during the evocation of emotional thoughts. 
Uniformely, there was a processing advantage for positively (negatively) valenced 
stimuli in the upper (lower) parts of the visual field, or the processing of upper 
(lower) visual field stimuli biased later emotional judgments towards the positive 
(negative) side. When participants’ spatial biases were measured as a function of 
their emotional state, either as a trait variable or experimentally manipulated, 
positive relative to negative emotions invariably induced upward shifts in spatial 
attention (Fisher, 1964; Wapner et al., 1957). Recently, Casasanto and Dijkstra (2010) 
had participants move marbles either from a lower to a higher level or in the reverse 
direction. Movement direction influenced the retrieval time for autobiographic 
memories (negative or positive, by instruction). Specifically, positively valenced 
memories were retrieved faster during upward movements, and the retrieval of 
negatives memories was speeded up by downward movements. The only 
investigation requiring subjects to draw lines to represent the emotional content of a 
list of words (Lundholm, 1921) found upward slopes for positively and downward 
slopes for negative affect. To our knowledge, vertical line bisection, despite its use in 
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normal subjects (Jeerakathil & Kirk, 1994), has not been used in studies on spatial-
emotional interactions. 
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Table 9: Synopsis of 9 experiments on interactions between healthy human subjects' emotional 
processing and attention along the vertical axis 
 
Reference (chronological order) Task(s) Major finding(s) 
   
Lundholm, 1921 To represent the affective tone of 
adjectives by drawing lines (no further 
instructions as to line orientation) 
The majority of negatively (positively) 
toned words were represented by lines with 
a downward (upward) directional tendency 
 
Wapner et al., 1957 
 
To adjust the vertical extension of one's 
straight-ahead ("subjective horizon") after 
getting (veridical) information of having 
passed or failed a mid-term examination 
 
 
Compared to a neutral baseline, A marks 
produced upward-shifts and F marks 
downward-shifts in the subjective horizon 
Fisher, 1964 To describe the movement direction in an 
illusory motion paradigm and to adjust the 
vertical extension of one's straight-ahead 
("subjective horizon"). To give a verbal 
description of (neutral) emotional facial 
expressions 
  
Subjects, who used more sadness-related 
adjectives in the description of facial 
expressions (1) perceived more downward 
illusory motion trajectories and (2) showed 
stronger downward-shifts in the subjective 
horizon 
Meier & Robinson, 2004 
(Study 1)  
 
 
Meier & Robinson, 2004 
(Study 2) 
 
 
 
Wilson & Peper, 2004 
 
 
 
 
Crawford et al., 2006 
(Exp. 1 to 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Casasanto and Dijkstra, 2010 
(Exp. 1) 
 
 
 
 
Casasanto and Dijkstra, 2010 
(Exp.2) 
 
To evaluate positive and negative 
emotional words presented in the upper or 
lower half of a computer screen  
 
To evaluate emotional words in the centre 
of a computer screen prior to perform a 
letter discrimination task with stimuli in the 
upper or lower half of the screen  
 
To generate positive or negative thoughts 
while in an upright or slumped body 
posture and to rate task difficulty 
separately for the two posture conditions 
 
To watch affectively evocative pictures 
(positive or negative valence) at variable 
vertical locations on a screen and to later 
recall the position of each picture, 
displayed again, but in the centre of the 
screen 
 
To retrieve positive or negative 
autobiographical memories while moving 
marbles either upward or downward 
(Instruction e.g. “tell me about a time you 
felt proud of yourself”) 
 
Same apparatus as in Exp. 1, but with 
valence-neutral instruction (e.g. “tell me 
about an event that happened yesterday”) 
 
Positive words were faster evaluated when 
presented in the upper half, negative words 
when presented in the lower half  
 
Positive evaluations primed letter 
discriminations in the upper field, negative 
evaluations primed discriminations in the 
lower field 
 
The majority of participants indicated that 
the generation of specifically positive 
thoughts was easiest in the upright posture 
 
 
Relative to negatively valenced pictures, 
positively valenced pictures were biased 
towards upward locations in memory 
 
 
 
 
Positive memories retrieved faster during 
upward movements, negative memories   
during downward movements  
 
 
 
Direction of movements determines 
emotional content of memories. Moving 
marbles upward caused participants to 
retrieve more positive memories, moving 
them downward more negative memories 
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In the present study we set out to compare the impact of positive and negative 
emotions on line bisection, both in the horizontal and radial extension. We used the 
contemplation of autobiographic memories as a potentially biasing trigger and 
predicted a leftward and distal bias during the evocation of negative memories and a 
rightward and proximal bias for positive emotions. By testing also a group of 
children, we wanted to explore whether the emotion-space interactions would 
resemble those found in the adult participants. Because of constraints in the time 
available for testing the children, we renounced including line bisection in the 
vertical dimension.  
 
Methods 
 
Participants  
The experiment was performed in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the 
Declaration of Helsinki, and adult subjects provided written informed consent before 
participating. Forty healthy undergraduate men of the University of Zurich 
participated in the experiment (mean age = 22.7 years, SD = 2.2 years). All subjects 
were right-handed according to a 13-item handedness inventory (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1987). An uneventful history of neurological or psychiatric diseases and of 
any substance abuse and learning disorders was assured by means of a brief 
neuropsychiatric interview (Campbell, 2000). In addition, we tested 35 children (20 
girls) age six or seven, all right-handed according to the hand spontaneously used in 
the bisection tasks. They were recruited from the primary school of Bellinzona 
(Switzerland). According to teacher information and inferred by the absence of any 
medication use, none suffered from any neurological or psychiatric disease.  
 
Tasks and Procedure 
Participants were required to mark, with a sharp pencil held in the dominant right 
hand, the midpoint of each of 48 lines. There were two conditions, one inducing a 
positive emotional state, the other a negative emotional state. In each condition, 12 
horizontal lines and 12 radial lines, all 26.0 cm long, had to be bisected. Horizontal 
and radial lines were presented blocked, but one line after the other on A4 sheets 
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positioned in the participant’s midsaggittal plane. Order of line orientation and 
emotion condition was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Adults were individually tested, children in two groups of 17 subjects each. Before 
starting the bisection task, adults were instructed to remember a highly emotional 
personal life event (negative or positive) and to contemplate this event as vividly as 
possible during the entire condition. Each sheet was removed by the experimenter as 
soon as a bisection was performed (there was an interval of about 3 seconds between 
trials). Children were analogously instructed, but had to imagine “something very 
pleasant” or “something very unpleasant”, and examples were provided for pleasant 
(eating ice cream, making a ride on a favorite city) and unpleasant events (having 
seriously hurt oneself, being punished for having committed something forbidden). 
Once having bisected a line, each child turned the page. Deviations from the 
objective midpoint were measured to the nearest 0.5 mm (negative values indicating 
leftward and proximal bias), and means for the two types of line orientation and 
emotion condition were calculated separately. 
Table 10: Experimental design of study 3  
Calculation of the 
average displacement 
from mid-line in mm 
over all 12 lines for 
each participant  
 Average 
deviation from 
mid-line 
 
 
Dependent 
variables 
 Positive 
Negative 
 
Horizontal 
Radial 
 
Adults 
Children 
Type of induced 
emotion 
 
Axis 
 
 
Age Group 
 
Independent 
variables 
Operationalization Levels Variables   
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Results 
 
Horizontal Line Bisection  
Fig. 7 displays the mean deviations in horizontal line bisection for adults and 
children and the two emotion conditions separately. A repeated measures ANOVA 
of the average deviation (Grand mean = -2.98 mm, SD = 5.08 mm) with emotion 
condition (positive, negative) as within-subject factor and age group as between-
subject factor revealed two main effects: (1) a main effect of age group (F(1,73) = 11.1, 
p < .001); overall leftward displacement was larger in children compared to adults. 
(2) A main effect of emotion condition (F(1,73) = 6.4, p < .01) indicated that leftward 
displacement was larger after negative compared to positive emotion evocation. The 
interaction was clearly not significant (F(1,73) = .40, p > .5). 
One sample t-tests of the overall bias (mean of all bisections, collapsed over both 
emotion conditions) indicated a marginally significant leftward deviation for adults 
(mean = -1.26 mm, SD = 3.83 mm; t(1,39) = 2.08, p = .044) and a highly significant 
leftward deviation for children (mean = -4.94 mm, SD = 5.66 mm; t(1,34) = 5.16, p < 
0.001). See Fig. 7 for illustration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Magnitude of pseudoneglect (left-sided attentional shift) under contemplation of a 
positive event (white bars) and a negative event (dark bars) for adults (n= 40) and children (n= 35). 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Both groups displayed a significant leftward deviation under contemplation of 
negative events (Children group: paired t-test, t=6.73, p=<.0001; Adults: t=2.37, 
p=.022). Within the children group, the magnitude of leftward shift was significantly 
different between conditions (t=2.77, p<.01, two-tailed; analogous values for adults: 
t=1.20, p=.23).    
 
A repeated measures ANOVA of the average deviation only within the children group 
revealed no significant main effect of gender (F(1,33)=.130, p=.721) nor any 
interaction involving the factor gender (F(1,33)=1.877, p=.180).  
 
A repeated measures ANOVA of the number of bisections with emotion (positive, 
negative) and direction of bias (leftward, rightward) as within-subject factors and age 
group as a between-subject factor revealed a main effect of direction of bias (F(1, 73) 
=14.57, p<.001), but no main effect of emotion (F(1,73)=.118, p= .732). There was also 
a main effect of age group (F(1,73)= 314.30, p<.001); children were less accurate than 
adults, regardless of the direction of the deviation. Among the two-way interactions 
only the interaction between emotion and direction of shift was significant 
(F(1,73)=6.878, p=.011). Contemplating negative events resulted in a higher number 
of leftward shifts. The triple interaction was also not significant (F(1,73)=.095, p= 
.758). 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA of the number of leftward vs rightward bias only 
within the children group revealed no significant main effect of gender (F(1,33)=2.635, 
p=.114) nor any significant interaction involving the factor gender. 
 
Radial Line Bisection  
A repeated measures ANOVA of the average deviation (grand mean = 8.12 mm, SD= 
5.62 mm) with emotion condition (positive, negative) as within-subject factor and age 
group as between-subject factor revealed no main effects and no interaction (main 
effect of emotion: F(1,73) = 1.73, p > .19, main effect of age group: F(1,73) = 1.27, p > 
.26, interaction: F(1,73) = .14, p > .7). One sample t-test of the overall bias (mean of all 
bisections, collapsed over emotion conditions) revealed a significant distal bias in 
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both adults (mean = 8.80 mm, SD = 4.12 mm; t(1,39) = 13.5, p < .001) and children 
(mean = 7.33 mm, SD = 6.94 mm; t(1,34) = 6.25, p < .001). A repeated measures 
ANOVA of the average deviation only with children group revealed no significant 
main effect of gender (F(1,33)=.265, p=.610) nor an interaction involving the factor 
gender (F(1,33)=.041, p=.841).  
 
Repeated measures ANOVA of the number of far vs near bisections with emotion 
(positive, negative) and direction of bias (near, far) as within-subject factor and age 
group as between-subject factor revealed a main effect of emotion (F(1,73)=309.01, 
p=.000), but no main effect of direction of bias (F(1,73)=.029, p=.614. Among the two-
way interactions only the interaction between emotion and age group was significant 
(F(1,73)=64.68, p=.000). The triple interaction was not significant (F(1,73)=.013, 
p=.909). A highly significant effect of age group was found (F(1,73)=1179.543, 
p=.000).  
 
A repeated measures ANOVA of the number of far vs near bisections only within the 
children group revealed no significant main effect of gender (F(1,33)=.070, p=.793.) nor 
a significant  interaction involving the factor gender.  
 
Discussion 
 
To investigate and quantify asymmetries in spatial attention a number of paper-
pencil tasks exist. The line bisection task requires participants to spontaneously 
indicate the middle of horizontal lines of various lengths, presented on paper sheets. 
This task is traditionally used with neglect patients (Bisiach et al., 1983), where 
unilateral brain lesions (usually in the RH) induce an attentional shift away from the 
contralateral hemispace, bringing the most spectacular example of asymmetrical 
exploration of space (Kerkhoff, 2001). Even if in a less pronounced manner, biased 
space perception has been evidenced also in healthy subjects, in both left/right and 
near/far space. In fact, when bisecting horizontal lines, people tend to show a 
leftward bias, so-called “pseudoneglect” (Bowers & Heilman, 1980). When bisecting 
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radial lines they erroneously displace the midline distal to the line’s center 
(Chewning et al., 1998). 
We know that attentional shifts in space are modulated by a number of factors, 
among which are gender, handedness, hand used for the bisection as well as age 
(Jewell & McCourt, 2000).  
In the present experiment, we used the line bisection task, to our knowledge for the 
first time, to quantify the magnitude of horizontal and radial attentional shifts 
induced by temporary emotional states, in both children and adults.   
It is plausible to suppose that, if metaphorical cognition mediates the emotion/space 
relation, children could be expected to show smaller effects, because of shorter 
exposure to common metaphors. On the other hand, some studies suggest the 
presence of synaesthetic cross-modality correspondences already in preverbal 
infants, so it cannot be excluded that also emotion/ space interactions do not need to 
be learned, but are already present at birth (Walker et al., 2010). Further evidence for 
the view that the interconnections between emotion and space are deeply rooted in 
an organism’s nervous system, derives from studies on animals lateral biases in 
response to highly emotive stimuli.  
 
Horizontal line bisection 
Over both age groups and emotion conditions, our participants showed a significant 
leftward bias, i.e. pseudoneglect, well-known from studies on horizontal bisection 
(Bowers & Heilman, 1980). This pseudoneglect was marginally significant for adults, 
but highly significant for the children. This finding is in line with the results of 
previous investigations of age-related effects on bisection performance: with 
increasing age people tend to show a decreased leftward error (Fujii et al., 1995). 
Many studies indicate that pseudoneglect is stronger in younger than older and that 
young children show a generally low bisection accuracy (Jewell & McCourt, 2000; 
van Vugt et al., 2000). 
Concerning the effect of emotion on direction of bisection error, we found a larger 
leftward displacement after negative compared to positive emotion evocation. This is 
in line with classical valence theories of emotional hemispheric processing, which 
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propose a specialization of the LH for positive emotions and of the RH for negative 
emotions (Demaree et al., 2005).  
However, although negative thoughts enhance pseudoneglect in both children and 
adults, this tendency is statistically significant only in children. One possible 
interpretation is that emotion exerts a decreasing effect on space exploration with an 
individual’s increasing age. Alternatively, this effect could merely be an artefact of 
the overall larger bisection error in our children group. In fact, when looking at the 
difference between the two valence conditions as a percentage of the overall 
deviation, a different picture emerges. That is why this second explanation seems to 
be more convincing to us. We note that future research should include a baseline 
condition without any emotion evocation: this would probably help to clarify the 
actual impact of age on emotion-dependent attentional shifts.   
The absence of a corresponding rightward shift induced by positive emotions could 
be related to the marked and robust tendency to always bisect to the left. 
Alternatively, negative emotional stimuli may be more powerful in modulating 
attention in space than positive stimuli (Crawford & Cacioppo, 2002; Pourtois et al., 
2006; Pourtois & Vuilleumier, 2006).  
 
Radial line bisection 
Looking at the bisection mean of all radially placed lines collapsed over emotional 
valence, we found a significant distal bias in both adults and children, which 
supports results from previous studies (Barrett et al., 2002). Contrary to our 
hypothesis that positive affects will trigger approach behavior (“near space” bias), 
whereas negative affects rather leads to avoidance behavior (“far space” bias), 
remembering or imagining emotional events did not influence attention along the 
near/ far space axis. This null finding appears puzzling in view of the many studies 
that described an emotional mediation of proximal-distal gradients in spatial 
attention (see Table 8). Our failure to establish an association may indicate that line 
bisection is less suitable to monitor emotion/space interaction along the radial 
(compared to the horizontal) axis. As evident from a comparison of Table 7 and 8, the 
emotional connotations of “left” and “right” are arguably more direct and less 
metaphorical than those of “near” and “far”.  
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The line bisection task chosen for this study has the advantage to be brief and easy to 
administer, also with children. However, a disadvantage is that many factors may 
modulate performance. In order to optimally reduce the influence of factors other 
than emotion, follow-up studies should carefully control hand and eye movements 
during the act of bisection. More generally, the focus should be put on the 
development of alternative methodologies, able to differentiate the influence of a 
temporal emotional state on the passive perception of space from that on the active 
exploration of space. Presumably they will also help to elucidate the nature of near/ 
far asymmetries related to emotion. Finally, future studies should consider both 
participant’s emotional state and traits, as their interactive effects on spatial 
processing is largely unknown.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In our study, emotions influenced the magnitude of attentional shifts on a left/right 
axis, but not on a near/ far dimension. Remembering or imagining negative events 
enhanced pseudoneglect, which suggest that an induced temporary emotional state 
is able to bias the way we perceive and explore space. If anything, the effect of 
emotion on spatial attention seems to be larger for children than for adults. 
From a most general point of view, our findings of a tight interconnection between 
emotional and spatial processing add to a growing literature indicating the parietal 
lobes as key structures for the processing of non-physical aspects of space. Relational 
reasoning (Hinton et al., 2010), social distance (Yamakawa et al., 2009) and empathic 
concern (Thakkar et al., 2009) have all been discussed in the frame of parietal 
contributions to symbolic space. It is well possible that emotion may turn out to be a 
crucial mediator of these contributions 
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               Discussion 
 
Self-awareness refers to the conscious experience of our own individuality. This term 
describes the ability to perceive, appreciate and evaluate one's own existence, 
including one's own traits, feelings and behaviors. It undoubtedly represents a 
fundamental aspect of our life, giving significance to our human experience in the 
world. After all, what value would our existence have if we would not have the 
opportunity to be aware of it? 
There are many kinds of self-awareness. Among the most important is the capacity to 
attribute one’s own thoughts, emotions and body movements to one’s self and to 
make a subjective experience of them. Self-awareness includes the experience of 
existing in time, as an individual, with a past and a future, in a network of social 
relationships. It enables us to consciously experience the temporary intentions and 
goals, which guide our actions.   
The conscious experience of being an individuum separated from others results from a 
construction, performed continuously by our brain, in relation with external and 
interoceptive changes. The self is highly malleable and subject to a laborious process 
of shaping: in fact, activity in the brain creates an experience of the outside world 
and an “internal image” of our individuality. The cerebral hemispheres perpetually 
integrate and process the multisensory information coming from the outside world, 
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combining it with the internal emotional and cognitive changes. Through this 
process, they continuously revise and update the subjective self-experience.  
Studies of brain damage evidenced that in some cases, our brain fails to construct a 
truthful image of the self, and it creates false knowledge. Abnormal neural activity 
may result in a false knowledge of the physical world. Auditory, visual or tactile 
hallucinations are typical manifestations of the fallibility of our brain and of the 
inherent fragility characterizing “reality”.  
Sometimes, alterations in functional circuits result in an altered experience of one’s 
own individuality, like in the case of autoscopic phenomena (i.e. reduplications of 
one’s own body and perceived self; Brugger et al., 1997), of phantom limbs (Melzack, 
1992) , or of confabulatory behaviors (Mckay & Kinsbourne, 2010).  
 
Awareness of illness is one of the facets of self-awareness. As other kinds of 
awareness, the appreciation of one’s health state is characterized by an essential 
subjectivity (Metzinger, 2002).  
Patients suffering from anosognosia lack the ability to recognize a specific illness or 
deficit: during some hours or days, they are themselves free from the obviousness 
given by their senses. Their own brain tells them that they are healthy, able to move, 
to see, or to speak just like every other normal person. Since a failure in illness 
recognition has serious consequences for recovery and may impair the efficacy of 
rehabilitative measures, the study of this disorder is not only of theoretical interest, 
but also of great clinical relevance.  
 
Anosognosia involves unawareness of a specific impairment. The lack of awareness 
can take many forms: hemiplegic patients may fail to acknowledge their motor 
impairment; blind persons may claim that they can see; aphasics may be completely 
unaware of their language deficits. Similarly, Alzheimer’s patients may fail to 
acknowledge their memory impairment and patients suffering from hemispatial 
neglect may seem convinced of equally exploring both sides of space.  
In all forms of anosognosia, unawareness can vary in severity, reaching from a 
simple indifference toward one’s own illness or deficit to an active and vehement 
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denial of one’s own disability accompanied by confabulation. Anosognosic 
symptoms may fluctuate and in case of AHP they usually become less intense over 
time. They occur more frequently and are more severe after RH lesions, and their 
incidence is higher after large lesions, comprising a wide range of cortical and 
subcortical brain areas. In the last two decades, many authors investigated the 
anatomical correlate of denial trying to identify which regions are specifically 
damaged when anosognosia is observed. While most studies agree that lesions 
usually involve the RH, the intra-hemispheric localization of the damage leading to 
anosognosia appears more controversial.  
 
Clinical evidence suggests that the ability to detect illness or impairment may be, as 
many other cognitive functions, lateralized. Many behavioral and lesion studies 
provided evidence that a functional balance between the two cerebral hemispheres is 
required to assure an emotional equilibrium (Davidson & Sutton, 1995; Gainotti, 
1972).  In the same way, a functional balance seems to be necessary for a correct 
detection of one’s own dysfunction (Ramachandran, 1995).  
 
A century of research led to the conclusion that denial of illness does not result 
simply from the need to protect oneself from sadness or depression, nor is there 
evidence that it would constitute a sign of global intellectual impairment (Marcel et 
al. , 2004; Orfei et al. , 2007).  
However, current theories of anosognosia suffer from a lack of specificity and fail to 
characterize a common neural mechanism, which is impaired in different forms of 
unawareness of illness. For instance, recent explanatory models of AHP mainly focus 
on the role of altered intentionality and motor mechanisms’ disruption, which are 
nowadays considered to be responsible for generating unawareness of motor failure 
(Frith et al., 2000; Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2008). Nevertheless, these 
explanations are suitable only for AHP. Present-day models are not able to explain 
the marked incidence of RH lesions among patients with the disorder. They also fail 
to account for different forms of anosognosia.  
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The primary purpose of this thesis was to draw attention to the cognitive processes 
accountable for different forms of anosognosia. We wanted to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the higher incidence of RH damages that distinguishes the clinical 
heterogeneity of the phenomenon (Breier et al., 1995; Pia et al., 2004).  
In attempting to identify the neural network essential for the appraisal of one’s own 
well-being we focused on the study of healthy positive illusions. We introduced the 
term of nosognosia, the normal function that is impaired in anosognosia. Nosognosia 
refers to a capacity for evaluating our current level of physical and mental well-being 
and detecting dysfunction. We have put anosognosia and nosognosia on a continuum 
and demonstrated that the same mechanism involved in the obstinate denial of 
illness is probably implicated in the illusion of invulnerability that characterizes 
healthy nosognosia. 
 
We discovered that the activation of the right parieto-insular cortex, but not of the left 
- realized using cold water irrigation of the left external ear – reduces unrealistic 
optimism for one’s own future health state in a way comparable to the temporary 
abolishment of anosognosic denial. The observed effect, resulting from a 
physiological manipulation of unilateral brain activity, corroborates a neural basis of 
positive illusions (Sharot et al., 2007). Most important, besides opening new ways in 
the field of anosognosia research and on the possible intertwining between 
pathology and normality, this finding highlights the asymmetrical contribution of the 
cerebral hemispheres to illness awareness (Ramachandran, 1994, 1995). 
The majority of authors agree that the contribution of the right hemisphere to an 
individual’s self-awareness is larger than that of the left hemisphere (Devinski, 2000). 
Our results on healthy individuals support this view, suggesting that the function we 
called nosognosia is most likely based on a delicate functional balance between the 
two hemispheres. Recent neuroimaging studies indicated the insular cortex as a 
relevant anatomical region, crucially involved in different aspects of self-awareness 
(Karnath et al., 2005; Craig, 2009). More specifically, we think that the right parieto-
insular cortex is a key structure essential for the appraisal of one’s own physical and 
cognitive functionality. Presumably, the disruption of neural network involving this 
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structure through structural, functional or effective connectivity (Friston et al., 1993b) 
may be responsible for different forms of anosognosia.  
 
The secondary aim of this thesis was to investigate functional hemispheric 
asymmetries that lead to subjective emotional experience. In particular, we focused 
on the interplay between emotional processing and spatial attention. Studies from 
both human and animal research evidenced a specialization of each hemisphere for 
dealing with information incoming from the contralateral hemispace, which 
coincides with a similar specialization for stimuli that have a positive or a negative 
valence. Many authors found a superiority of the right hemisphere in detecting 
threatening information and reported an association between negative affect and left 
hemispace (MacNeilage et al., 2009; Demaree et al., 2005; Kinsbourne, 1978). In study 
1 and 2, we tested the validity of this theory in a sample of healthy participants. We 
found that the presence of attentional asymmetries on a left/right axis – quantified 
using the line bisection task – predicted the reaction times for the recognition of 
verbal stimuli with emotional valence. Participants displaying a leftward line 
bisection bias, recognized negative words more quickly. Subsequently, we 
discovered that temporary emotional states influenced the way we explore space. 
Remembering or imagining negative events enhanced leftward shift in spatial 
attention. These results corroborate the different contribution of the cerebral 
hemispheres in the modulation of our emotional experiences and the predominant 
RH role in negative emotional processing. They confirm the influence of the parietal 
lobes in the processing of non-spatial information (Yamakawa et al., 2009; Thakkar et 
al., 2009) and the strong relationship linking spatial attention and emotional 
experience (Drago et al., 2008). 
  
The present doctoral thesis has thus produced to two major findings.  
First, we found evidence for a common neural basis of healthy unrealistic optimism 
and pathological anosognosia. This supports the view that no clear division separates 
pathological from healthy states. We know that normal self-awareness is dependent 
on several parallel processes. Although it is likely that independent neural 
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mechanisms are responsible for different forms of anosognosia, we strongly 
propagate the existence of a single high-level cognitive process, a “nosognosia 
system” decisively responsible for the detection of dysfunction, to whom impairment 
is accountable for both healthy positive illusions related to illness and anosognosic 
confabulatory behaviors. The functionality of this system relies on an 
interhemispheric balance (Ramachandran, 1994, 1995).  
Future researchers should, in our opinion, look for new ways to study functionality 
and lateralization of the nosognosia system.  
They should more explicitly inquire about the effect of right parieto-insular damages 
on positive bias related to one’s own illness, applying alternative experimental 
methods (for instance TMS), able to modulate small brain regions in a more selective 
manner. The CVS method is safe, inexpensive and non-invasive; however it presents 
some limits. In fact, it influences brain activity in different areas and some argue that 
its effect lacks specificity. We think that new promising techniques for modulating 
brain activity, as for example the combination of TMS and high-density EEG 
(Massimini et al., 2005), should be exploited to explore how changes in effective 
connectivity linked to right parietal damages influence awareness of illness. 
Finally, experimental research should further investigate the impact of individual 
differences in baseline hemispheric activity in frontal and parietal brain regions on 
the capacity to detect and process threatening self-related informations.  
 
Second, our results corroborate a superiority of the right hemisphere in processing 
negative self-related information. We argue that the parietal contribution for non-
physical aspects of space needs further examination. This is a critical aspect, 
especially to the aim of deepening the understanding of neurological disorders, 
resulting from damages to this region. In particular, studies on anosognosia should 
broaden the spotlight of attention toward the role of right parieto-insular areas in 
mediating negative affects related to illness detection.  
The appraisal of one’s own well-being is inseparable from one’s own internal feeling 
states and emotion-related cognitions. For this reason, a more systematic study of 
possible interactions between emotional imbalance and the inability to detect illness 
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may lead, in our opinion, to a deeper understanding of the neural system implicated 
in anosognosic denial.  
Finally, follow-up studies should aim to elucidate how emotions modulate parietal 
space processing. Particular consideration should be given to the modulation of 
perception and exploration of space by emotional states and traits.  
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